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I. INTRODUCTION
Following the Civil War, black Americans began acquiring land in
earnest; by 1920 almost one million black families owned farms. Since
then, black rural landownership has dropped by more than 98% and
continues in rapid decline-there are now fewer than 19,000 black-operated
farms left in America.' By contrast, white-operated farms dropped only by
half, from about 5.5 million to 2.4 million.2 Commentators have offered as
partial explanations the consolidation of inefficient small farms and intense
racial discrimination in farm lending.3 However, even absent these factors,
the unintended effects of old-fashioned American property law might have
led to the same outcome. Because black farmers often did not make wills,
their heirs took the land as co-owners. Over generations, co-owners
multiplied, the farms became unmanageable, and the land was partitioned
and sold, a seemingly inevitable "tragedy of the commons" in which too
many owners waste a common resource.' Black rural landownership may
seem a dusty topic, peopled with hardscrabble tales of property past.
Consider, though, the daunting possibility that property future-think
biomedical research, post-apartheid restitution, hybrid residential
associations, perhaps cyberspace-may have the same analytic structure, be
subject to a similar punishing legal regime, and face the same fate as the
black rural landowner.
Overcoming the tragic fate of commons property should not be so hard.
Until now, however, legal theorists have often worked within a framework
that makes happier solutions difficult to imagine. Typically, theorists have
relied on a thin utilitarian language yoked to a narrow conceptual map of
property. One school, worrying that rational owners will overconsume
commons resources, has embraced the so-called Biackstonian image of
private property with "sole and despotic dominion" at the core. Another
school, after showing how small, close-knit groups can successfully
conserve commons resources if they sharply restrict exit, has advocated a
version of commons property.6 For both schools, the image of tragic
1. See infra Section IV.A (discussing the black farm example in detail). See generally U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE DECLINE OF BLACK FARMING IN AMERICA 3 tbl.l.1 (1982)
[hereinafter BLACK FARMING] (describing this decline and its causes); 15,000 Blacks Seek Shares
in Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1999, at A25.
2. BLACK FARMING, supra note 1, at 2-3.
3. See, e.g., ROBERT S. BROWNE, ONLY SIX MILLION ACRES: THE DECLINE OF BLACK
OWNED LAND IN THE RURAL SouTH 28-33 (1973); Too Little, Too Late: Black Farmers'
DiscriminationSettlement May Not Ease Years of Pain, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 5, 1999, at Al.

4. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SC. 1243, 1244-45 (1968) (introducing
the metaphor); see also infra notes 36, 39 (discussing antecedents).
5. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347,
354 (1967). On private property, see 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2; see also Carol

M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and
Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REv. 129, 150-51 (1998), which discusses this image of private property.
6. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 35-36 (1990); Margaret A. McKean, Success on the Commons: A
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outcomes proves an ideal foil, one that implicitly points theorists toward
their preferred normative solutions. Privatization seems inevitable for
utilitarians with a liberal bent, because they believe that locking people
together violates a fundamental concern for individual autonomy. By
contrast, illiberal communitarian solutions seem relatively attractive to
those who are ready to sacrifice individual autonomy for collective goals.
While these underlying normative commitments drive the familiar debate
over tragic outcomes, they never surface as the focus for analysis of
commons resource management.
In this Article, we argue that linking the utilitarian vocabulary of
economic success with the conceptual binary of private/commons property
creates too paltry a framework when utility cannot be safely reduced to
wealth alone, that is, when the social gains from cooperation are not just
fringe benefits, but instead are a major part of what people seek. A better
framework focuses more directly on the underlying normative
commitments that animate the tragedy debate, and then challenges images
that suggest their inevitable friction. Our approach also differentiates
among resource dilemmas, for example, distinguishing "open access," in
which anyone at all may use a resource and no one may be excluded, from
"commons ownership," in which a bounded group, such as a farm family,
controls access to a valuable resource.7 This Article does not discuss the
often losing game of open access; rather, we focus exclusively on
institutions for commons resource management where participation may be
of the essence, the terms for exit matter, and the calculus of utility must
account for incommensurable goals.
For this (substantial) subset of commons ownership settingsincluding, for example, marital property, partnerships, condominium
associations, and close corporations-the polarizing vocabulary of the
"tragedy of the commons" debate renders invisible the most difficult and
important tradeoffs and unintentionally freezes legal imagination and
innovation.8 There is no neutral, pre-political tragedy of the commons: The
Comparative Examination of Institutions for Common Property Resource Management, 4 J.
THEORETICAL POL. 247, 261-62 (1992); William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA
L. REV. 1335, 1343-44 (1991).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 20-24 (discussing the mistaken conflation of open access
and commons property). Though Garrett Hardin introduced the term "tragedy of the commons,"
Hardin, supra note 4, at 1244-45, each example he analyzed could more precisely, but less
evocatively, have been described as a "tragedy of open access." Additionally, commons resource
institutions may be evaluated along other salient axes, for example, whether restrictions on exit are
property or contract based, infra text accompanying notes 79-83; creation is voluntary or involuntary,
infra text accompanying note 134 and Subsection 11I.B.3.b; management is participatory or
hierarchical, infra text accompanying note 180; and scope is limited or comprehensive, infra
Subsection [I.B.3.b.
8. Cf FELIX S. COHEN, Transcendental Nonsense and the FunctionalApproach, in THE LEGAL
CONSCIENCE: SELECTED PAPERS OF FELIX S. COHEN 33 (Lucy Kramer Cohen ed., 1960) (showing

how legal conceptualism blocks ethical and empirical inquiry and shields the status quo from
normative reexamination); Robert Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 281, 287 (David Kairys ed., 1982) (stating that law is one of many
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metaphor itself assumes either open access (anarchy or no law) or law that
is hostile to cooperation. Rightly considered, the problem of managing
commons resources concerns not only tragic outcomes, but also tragic
choices: Are we doomed to choose between our liberal commitments and
the economic and social benefits available in a commons? No. Wellstructured law can, and often does, mediate liberty and cooperation. Thus,
we contest communitarian claims that elevate illiberal commons property
and too quickly jettison individual autonomy; equally, we dispute the
claims of privatizers who assert an exclusive preference for old-fashioned
private property and who disparage cooperation.
For many resources, the most appealing ownership form proves to be a
participatory commons regime that also allows members the freedom to
come and go. We call this structure a "liberal commons" -an ideal type of
ownership distinct from both private and commons property, but drawing
elements from each. Any legal regime can qualify as a liberal commons
when it enables a limited group of owners to capture the economic and
social benefits from cooperative use of a scarce resource, while also
ensuring autonomy to individual members who retain a secure right to exit.
Constructing a successful liberal commons is always challenging, but it is
not an inherently contradictory or practically unattainable goal.9
Legal regimes that account for a substantial and increasing share of
social life-again, consider marital property, partnerships, condominiums,
and close corporations-can be structured to be consonant with liberal
commons goals. When well-tailored, these institutions encourage people
voluntarily to come together to create limited-access and limited-purpose
communities dedicated to shared management of a scarce resource. They
offer internal governance mechanisms to facilitate participatory cooperation
and the peaceable joint creation of wealth, while simultaneously limiting
minority oppression and allowing exit. On their own, people are already
creating pervasive, though unremarked variations on liberal commons
themes. We provide a roadmap so law can better support their efforts.
The liberal commons construct should prove useful because it does not
simply revisit ongoing liberty/community and private/commons debates.
Instead, it reorganizes these debates altogether around a richer set of
questions and answers. On the questions front, we expand the evaluative

prism for commons resource management from a sole focus on economic
success to a broader view that explicitly includes the liberal value of exit as
well as noneconomic goals such as the intrinsic good of interpersonal
cooperation. We offer a consistent analytic language engaging precisely the
"clusters of belief,.... which are profoundly paralysis-inducing because they make it so hard for
people... even to imagine that life could be different and better").
9. As Michael Walzer notes, "[i]f we want the mutual reinforcements of community and
individuality to serve a common interest, we will have to act politically to make them effective.
They require certain background or framing conditions that can only be provided by state action."
MICHAEL WALZER, ON TOLERATION 111 (1997).
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widely shared values that seem to animate our most important commons
resource institutions. Also, on a descriptive level, our construct does better
than existing property categories at explaining how these institutions work.
On the answers front, an attractive feature of our approach is that it bounds
the range of solutions consonant with liberal commons values: Our
normative umbrella, while capacious, is not unlimited. We employ widely
shared conceptions of autonomy (as including a commitment to free exit)
and community (as both instrumentally and intrinsically valuable) to
provide the liberal commons with a critical edge and normative yardstick.
Across the wide variety of existing institutions where it may be deployed,
our construct often yields persuasive arguments for legal reform. By
rethinking the important questions and answers, and by intertwining
descriptive and normative elements, our interpretive approach yields a
strong result: We can help reconstruct many areas of law so they are more
consistent with their animating values," and we can confine the tragedy of
the commons metaphor to its proper, limited place in legal theory.
The goals of this Article are to advance a theory of the liberal commons
and to demonstrate its usefulness. Part II introduces the problem of tragic
choice. Relying on the private/commons dichotomy, theorists have chosen
between liberal and communitarian solutions to commons tragedy. Because
they have overlooked the liberal commons synthesis, they have missed how
law can shift debate in a happier direction. Part III proposes a theory of the
liberal commons that engages the problem of tragic choice. We explore the
widely shared, often buried, and potentially competing goals that law must
reconcile when people want to cooperate in managing a scarce resource but
fear abuse. We then discuss the background role that law can play in
guiding human behavior. Finally, we set out the three spheres of
decisionmaking that characterize the general form of the liberal commons
solution-the spheres of individual dominion, democratic self-governance,
and cooperation-enhancing exit. These three spheres are the core innovation
of our theory: They provide a coherent language for exploring the recurring
problems that law must address whenever it mediates liberty and
cooperation in commons ownership settings. Part IV rewards the reader's
patience with legal theory by bringing the liberal commons down to earth.
The example of declining black landownership is complex; we use it here
for the limited purpose of suggesting how the American law of coownership may systematically thwart cooperation. Current law fails them,
and us, because it lacks the three features of a liberal commons, features
that, we show, exist in other developed legal systems and are potentially
available in our own. While a liberal commons solution may be too late for
black farmers, their example can still catalyze useful reforms.

10. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 52-53 (1986) (developing an interpretive method
that "strives to make an object the best it can be" ).
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Can a liberal legal regime facilitate economically and socially
productive use of scarce resources in a crowded world where people want
or need to work together but worry that others may take advantage of them?
A theory of the liberal commons begins to provide an answer.
II.

TRAGIC CHOICE IN PROPERTY THEORY

Most lawyers, economists, and other social scientists learn of the
"tragedy of the commons" in the first weeks of school," and all are taught
that commons property is the axiomatic example of a prisoner's dilemma. 2
The usual economics-oriented reaction has been to build from tragedy to
private property; political theorists, by contrast, often solve tragedy by
focusing on thickly textured norms and the bonds of close-knit community.
Neither camp gives much focused attention to the role of law or to any
values other than economic success measured along a single metric. This
Part shows how the existing conceptual map pushes theorists into these
dichotomous approaches and renders invisible some of the most
challenging dilemmas that underlie management of commons resources.
A. A Typology of Property Forms
1. The StandardConceptualMap

Commons property takes its place alongside private property and state
property as part of the well-worn trilogy of ownership forms that constitute
the conceptual apparatus of property law. 13 These three species of property
are generally understood as ideal types, never present in pure form on the
ground, but always available to channel the justificatory and normative
debates that are of ultimate interest to legal theorists and reformers. 4 The
process of working from idealized types pervades property theory,
stretching back past Locke's discussion of ownership and forward to
modem images of the commons.
The trilogy is so entrenched as to seem almost natural, beyond serious
contestation or elaboration. Even to suggest tinkering raises a red flag for

11. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 40-59 (4th ed. 1998).
12. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 33-34 (1994);
AVINASH K. DIXIT& BARRYJ. NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY 347-49(1991).
13. On the limitations imposed by the standard conceptual map, see generally Michael A.
Heller, The Dynamic Analytics of Property Law, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 7 (2000). For the
familiar definitions, see, for example, JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY

(1988); Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Propertyand ContractEfficient?, 8 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 711, 715-16 (1980); and Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of
Property, in NOMOS XXIV: ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 3, 5-6 (1982).
14. For example, Frank Michelman states, "[w]e need some reasonably clear conceptions of
regimes that are decidedly not [private property], with which [private property] regimes can be
compared." Michelman, supra note 13, at 5.

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 110: 549

legal theorists. 5 Nevertheless, the ground is shifting under these old
categories to the point that they divert us from seeing new problems and
opportunities. Before showing how modem theorists have crafted a crabbed
version of the commons, we set commons property in its familiar habitat,
nestled alongside private property and state property.
a.

PrivateProperty

Private property is a difficult idea to pin down precisely; its boundaries
always fray at the edges. However, for legal theorists (and, even more so,
for ordinary lay folk' 6), the term seems reasonably coherent and capable of
simple definition. For example, Jeremy Waldron defines rules of private
property "around the idea that contested resources are to be regarded as
separate objects each assigned to the decisional authority of some particular
individual (or family or firm)." 17This simple definition can be multiplied
many times over, but all such definitions partake of and help keep current
William Blackstone's oft-repeated definition of private property as "that
sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other
individual in the universe." " The image of sole dominion has never
adequately described any real-world property ownership, as Blackstone
himself recognized.' 9 Nevertheless, his image endures through the ages and
continues to serve as a focal point for thinking about property, even as
people trade old-fashioned private property for the property arrangements
that we here call the liberal commons.
b.

Commons Property

Some theorists define commons property as a regime in which every
individual may use an object of property and no individual has the right to
15. See, e.g., Lawrence C. Becker, Too Much Property, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 196, 197-98
(1992). But even Becker notes that "we would lose a great deal of clarity and rigor if [the conceptual
apparatus] were ignored." Id. at 198.
16. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 116-18 (1977)
(exploring the lay view of property).
17. Jeremy Waldron, Property Law, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL
THEORY 3, 6 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996). Frank Michelman focuses attention on his definition of
rules for initial acquisition and reassignment. He focuses particularly on the ideas of sole ownership,
defined to mean that "[t]he rules must allow that at least some objects of utility or desire can be fully
owned by just one person," and freedom of transfer, defined to mean that "[o]wners are both
immune from involuntary deprivation or modification of their ownership rights and empowered to
transfer their rights to others at will, in whole or in part." Michelman, supra note 13, at 5.
18. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *2; see also JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 285-302 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (basing a theory of
private property on the principle that labor removes a resource from the commons and makes it
the exclusive property of the laborer).
19. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *212-15; Robert C. Ellickson, Propertyin Land, 102 YALE
L. 1315, 1362 n.237 (1993); Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk or, Blackstone's Anxiety,
108 YALE L. 601,602 (1998).

2001]

The Liberal Commons

stop someone else from using the object.2 Commentators have repeatedly
noted that this standard definition obscures an important distinction
between commons property and open access.2' Open access (or anarchy or
no law) is a "scheme of universally distributed, all-encompassing"
privilege. 2 By contrast, commons property designates resources that are
owned or controlled by afinite number of people who manage the resource
together and exclude outsiders, 23 what Carol Rose calls "commons on the
inside, [private] property on the outside." 24
This important distinction notwithstanding, the image of open access
still constitutes the core understanding of commons property, at least in

Anglo-American jurisprudence. As in the open access case, commons
property owners are often imagined to be entitled to unregulated use of the
commons resource and entitled to a governance regime in which no control
on resource use-no management or investment decision-can be imposed
on any single commoner absent that individual's consent.
c. State Property
State property, also called collective property, has been equally central
to standard narratives of property. 5 As Waldron notes, state property can be
defined as a property regime in which, "in principle, material resources are
answerable to the needs and purposes of society as a whole, whatever they
are and however they are determined, rather than to the needs and purposes
of particular individuals considered on their own." 6 Thus, a state property
regime is similar to commons property in that no individual stands in a
specially privileged position with regard to any resource, but it is
20. Thus, Frank Michelman defines a commons property regime as one where "there are
never any exclusionary rights. All is privilege. People are legally free to do as they wish, and are
able to do, with whatever objects (conceivably including persons) are in the [commons]."
Michelman, supra note 13, at 5.
21. JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE 143 (1988); OSTROM, supra note 6,
at 48, 222 n.23; GLENN G. STEVENSON, COMMON PROPERTY ECONOMICS: A GENERAL THEORY
AND LAND USE APPLICATIONS 8-10, 39-40 (1991); Ellickson, supra note 19, at 1322; Carol M.
Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991
DuKE L.J. 1, 3 n.4; Thriinn Eggertsson, Open Access Versus Common Property 8-9 (Oct. 2000)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal) ("The treatment of common property
in the literature is engulfed in confusion. The focal point of the confusion often is [Hardin's paper]
that actually discusses open access and its consequences.... In retrospect, the confusion over the
nature of common property probably was caused substantially by a mix-up of proper names and
theoretical categories.").
22. Michelman, supra note 13, at 9 (discussing commons property).
23. OSTROM, supra note 6, at 48, 222 n.23.
24. Rose, supra note 5, at 155. In other words, despite the similarities between open access
and commons property (multiple users and the resulting collective action difficulties), commons
property is also characterized by an important feature similar to private ownership: In both cases,
the users' group is strictly defined. STEVENSON, supra note 21, at 57; Ellickson, supra note 19, at
1322.
25. E.g., Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986).
26. WALDRON, supra note 13, at 40 & n.30.
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distinguished from commons property because the state has a special status
or distinct interest. 27 Although state property has often been considered the
main rival of private property,a it has become a less and less important
category, particularly since state socialism collapsed and privatization has
prevailed more and more in theoretical and policy debates. 29 Hence, the
trilogy of property forms often reduces in practice to a dichotomy of private
or commons.

2.

30

Focusing the Debate

The familiar conceptual map has limited debate in three distinct ways.3
First, as Heller has shown, the categorization is incomplete, and adding new

types such as anticommons property may help make visible previously
overlooked problems.32 Second, as Dagan has argued, the existing
categories, such as "private property," may themselves be renegotiated and
a richer, alternative conception developed. 3 Third, and the focus of this
27. Id. at 41. Additionally, as Waldron suggests, state property is not just a special case of a
private property regime, where the state just acts as another private owner. Instead, at a theoretical
level, the state is somehow expressing the collective interest in determining how a state property
resource is to be used. The collective, represented usually by the state, holds all rights of exclusion
and is the unitary locus of decisionmaking regarding the use of resources. So, a subsidiary set of
questions needs to be answered to specify fully a state property regime, including what the
"collective interest" is and what procedures will be used to apply that conception to a particular
resource. Id. at 40.
28. Indeed, part of the political science literature on the commons has come as a response to
this "false dichotomy." OSTROM, supra note 6, at 8-13; Bonnie J. McCay & James M. Acheson,
Human Ecology of the Commons, in THE QUEST ION OF THE COMMONS: THE CULTURE AND
ECOLOGY OF COMMUNAL RESOURCES 1, 7, 9, 13 (Bonnie J. McCay & James M. Acheson eds.,
1987).
29. To be sure, private property systems do contain, and it seems must contain, public
elements, typically organized as state property, such as highways, streets, and public parks.
Ellickson, supra note 19, at 1381 & n.342, 1397 n.413 (noting the scale and inevitability of public
space in cities); Rose, supra note 25, at 723 (discussing the effect of state property in enhancing
community wealth as well as sociability).
30. E.g., YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 99 (2d ed. 1997)
(stating that the standard economic analysis of property "tend[ed] to classify ownership status into
all-or-nothing categories, the latter being termed 'common property'-property that has no
restrictions placed on its use").
31. See generally Heller, supra note 13 (elaborating this argument).
32. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, Il1 HARV. L. REv. 621, 622-26 (1998). In an anticommons, too many owners
may each exclude others from a resource, the mirror image of a commons with a mirror tragedy:
Resources may be prone to waste through underuse, rather than from overuse. Heller's image of
anticommons property, and the tragedy that can ensue, shows how breaking out of the old trilogy
can crystallize emerging property relations that otherwise remain invisible. Ild. at 633-42
(discussing the consequences of misguided privatization of state property in postsocialist
economies); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Sci. 698, 698 (1998) (showing how efforts to spur
private investment in biomedical research by granting property rights may paradoxically result in
fewer drugs that save lives).
33. Hanoch Dagan, The Distributive Foundationof Corrective Justice, 98 MICH. L. REv. 138,
149 (1999). Dagan advocates a progressive conception of private property that incorporates our
commitments to social responsibility and to equality. According to this conception, private property
is not merely a bundle of rights, but also a social institution that creates bonds of commitment and
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work, we show that there is significant analytic and normative traction to be
gained from synthesizing features of existing types, private and commons,
to create vigorous hybrids including the liberal commons.34 There is a
subtle distinction to be made here: Our new construct is intended to reflect
a distinct ideal type of ownership, one that operates at the same level of
analysis as private or commons property; it does not refer to the
opportunistic mix of private and commons elements that typically appears
in any particularized resource management regime."
The seemingly immutable opposition of private and commons blinkers
legal scholars from imagining hybrid legislative and judicial solutions; it
presents the tragic but false choice of privatizing a resource or locking
people together. Our liberal commons ideal type offers an analytic tool that

deliberately elides the familiar legal opposition of private and commons, as
well as the more fundamental normative orientation toward liberty or
community.
B. Commons Tragedy as PrivatizationFoil
1. From Demsetz. . .

Echoing a familiar Aristotelian theme,3 6 the conventional wisdom for
many social scientists is that commons property generally leads to

responsibility among owners and others who live or work with the owner, or are otherwise
affected by the owner's properties. Furthermore, private property necessarily entails distribution,
since it is a source of economic and, therefore, also social, political, and cultural rights and
powers, the correlative of which are other people's duties and liabilities. Hanoch Dagan, Just
Compensation, Incentives, and Social Meanings, 99 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 2000);
Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REv. 741, 772-73, 779-81, 791-92
(1999).
34. See Carol M. Rose, Left Brain, Right Brain and History in the New Law and Economics of
Property,79 OR. L. REv. 479 (2000) (discussing limited commons property hybrids).
35. Robert Ellickson suggests two relevant types of organizational diversity, two
manifestations of the eclecticism of land regimes: either variations in the "initial bundles of rights
and transfer rules" or opportunistic mixtures of public and private ownership. Ellickson, supra
note 19, at 1387-88. The liberal commons construct relates only to the former type. For an
example of the other type, consider Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering
in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 131 (2000), which characterizes the medieval openfield system as a "semicommons." The resource is "owned and used in common for one major
purpose, but, with respect to some other major purpose, individual economic units ... have
property rights to separate pieces of the commons." Id.
36. ARISTOTLE, THE PouTcs (H. Rackham trans., 1932). A classic passage is:
Property that is common to the greatest number of owners receives the least
attention; men care most for their private possessions, and for what they own in
common less, or only so far as it falls to their own individual share; for in addition to
the other reasons, they think less of it on the ground that someone else is thinking about
it....
Id. at bk. 2, ch. 1, § 10 (Bekker § 1261b30-35). Also consider:
[Riegulations for the common ownership of property would give more causes for
discontent; for if both in the enjoyment of the produce and in the work of production
they prove not equal but unequal, complaints are bound to arise between those who
enjoy or take much but work little and those who take less but work more. And in
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tragedy.3 ' This claim-a truism of first-year law classes-is usually

introduced as one of the strongest justifications for the institution of private
property. 38 Although Garrett Hardin coined the term "the tragedy of the
commons," 3 9 Harold Demsetz was the first theorist to conduct a cost-

benefit analysis that aimed systematically to establish the long-run
superiority of private property over commons property.'
Demsetz discussed three types of costs from commons property
regimes-increased negotiating costs because of holdouts; increased
policing or monitoring costs; and the difficulties of too high a discount rate
that lead commoners to fail to internalize fully the interests of future
generations. 1 Private property, he claimed, generally solves these problems
general to live together and share all our human affairs is difficult, and especially to
share such things as these [farms and produce].
Id. atch. 2, § 2-3 (Bekiker § 1263a10-17).
37. Much influential recent thinking on property rights has itself been influenced by
divergent camps of economists-such as Demsetz, Alchian, North, and others-who have
extrapolated from the historical experience of Western European and American capitalism. For a
sampling of classics, see BARZEL, supra note 30; DOUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT PAUL
THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD: A NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY (1973); Armen A.
Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production,Information Costs, and Economic Organization,62 AM.
ECON. REv. 777 (1972); Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property Rights Paradigm,33 J.
ECON. HIST. 16 (1973); Demsetz, supra note 5; Eirik G. Furubotu & Svetozar Pejovich, Property
Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature, 10 J. ECON. LIT. 1137 (1972);
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and the Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); and Svetozar Pejovich, Towards
an Economic Theory of the Creation and Specification of Property Rights, 30 REV. Soc. ECON.
309 (1972).
38. E.g., GOTTFRIED DIETZE, IN DEFENSE OF PROPERTY 9 (1963). Dietze explains:
[T]he institution of private property has been defended on the grounds of justice,
freedom, progress, peace and happiness .... Common ownership, although enjoying
temporary vogues, has been rejected as utopian, as incompatible with the good of
society and the individual, as productive of quarrels, as retarding development, as
restraining freedom, as arbitrary and unjust.
Id.
39. Hardin, supra note 4. Before Hardin, H. Scott Gordon identified the tragedy without so
labeling it. H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource. The Fishery,
62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954). Hardin claimed that rational co-owners are bound to underinvest in the
common resource, while overexploiting it. Hardin, supra note 4, at 1244-45. But he never considered
the costs of any other legal arrangement, in particular the establishment and maintenance of a private
property regime. As Michael Taylor points out:
Every solution, every combination of property rights and controls, has its costs.
Private property rights are not costlessly created, modified, and enforced; state
regulation does not come free; and both may have effects which it is impossible to cost.
What solution is best must surely depend to some extent on the relative costs of the
possible solutions. Hardin ignores them.
Michael Taylor, The Economics and Politics of Property Rights and Common Pool Resources, 32
NAT. RES. J. 633, 635 (1992).
40. Demsetz, supra note 5.
41. Id. at 354-56. The difficulties posed by free riders for collective action were recognized by
jurists long before the recent law-and-economics scholarship, as the following Jewish law example
demonstrates. Rabbi Hayyim Yair Bachrach of Germany (d. 1701) addressed the validity of a
stipulation in a contract between some members of a community and an expert in shofar (ram's hom)
blowing, according to which the ritual service is to be performed only in the name of the paying
members of the community. In his opinion, R. Bachrach noted that the stipulation should apparently
be classified as the type in which "one benefits and the other sustains no loss" (Pareto superiority in
modern language), a type to which the applicable Jewish law rule was "exemption," that is, the
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by concentrating costs and benefits on owners, thus creating incentives to
use resources more efficiently.42 Demsetz was fully aware that these costs
do not disappear in a private property regime, but he insisted that they
would be dramatically reduced. 3 His account also includes an evolutionary
story that explains how private property rights develop to internalize these

externalities when pressure increases on the use of a resource." The
evolutionary part of his celebrated contribution has been rightly criticized,
and the problem remains a puzzle.4" But Demsetz's first proposition, that
private property is more cost-beneficial once demand pressures are high
enough, remains the conventional wisdom.
2.

... to Recent Law and Economics

Over the years, Demsetz's account has been somewhat refined. Terry
Anderson and P.J. Hill offer a more rigorous account of the benefits and
costs of private property rights definition-and-enforcement activity.'
Variables such as the crime rate, population density, cultural and ethical
attitudes, and the preexisting "rules of the game" of the institutional

stipulation could not operate to deprive nonpaying members from the spiritual benefits of the
contract. But R. Bachrach was also attentive to the detrimental incentive effects (free-riding) of
applying the exemption rule in these circumstances. His result seems unavoidable: The contracting
members were indeed allowed to restrict the group of spiritual beneficiaries of the shofar blowing to
themselves only. R. HAYYIM YAiR BACHRACH, Responsum 186, in RESPONSA HAVAT YAIR (1997).
42. Demsetz, supra note 5, at 356-57.
43. Id. at 356.
44. Id. at 350-53. Private property rights "arise when it becomes economic for those affected by
externalities to internalize benefits and costs." Id at 354; see also Hardin, supra note 4, at 1245
(explaining the increasing negative effects of freedom in a commons).
45. James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 325,
336-38 & n.44 (1992) (arguing that both Hardin and Demsetz end up begging the same question,
assuming the same problem away, and implicitly arguing that a community plagued by
noncooperation can improve its condition by cooperating); see also DuKEMINIER & KRIER, supra
note 11, at 56, 59 (noting that theory and empirical evidence suggest that values and other
variables prevent this evolutionary pattern from occurring in all situations); Carol M. Rose,
Property as Storytelling: Prespectivesfrom Game Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37 (1990) (proposing that after-the-fact narratives are necessary to explain
the development of property regimes, because they do not always unfold as logic predicts). Jim
Krier has reported to us that Demsetz has replied to the many criticisms of his theory by saying,
"That's why I called it 'Toward a Theory of Property Rights."'
46. Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American
West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163 (1975). They argue that increasing levels of definition-and-enforcement
activity lead to benefits because of the increased probability that people will be able to appropriate an
asset's worth. To elaborate, the benefit from property rights definition depends upon the value of the
asset and the degree to which the activity ensures that the value will be captured by the owner. Any
change in the price of the well-defined and well-enforced bundle of rights changes the return on
resources devoted to property rights questions. Furthermore, any increase in the productivity of a
definition-and-enforcement activity will shift the marginal benefit curve outward. An increase in the
probability of loss of an asset will usually result in an increase in the productivity of property rights
activity and thus will result in such a shift. Marginal benefits are also likely a declining function as
definition-and-enforcement activity increases (for reasons similar to the declining marginal physical
product of any input in general). Conversely, the marginal costs of property rights reorganization are
increasing because of the opportunity cost of resources used in property rights definition activities.
Id.; see also Smith, supra note 35, at 164 (making a similar claim).
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structure affect the probability of securing benefits from better-defined
private property rights. Anything that reduces the quantity of resources that
is necessary for definition-and-enforcement activity or lowers the
opportunity cost of such resources-such as changes in technology, in
resource endowments, or in the scale of operation-will affect marginal
costs. The equilibrium level of property rights definition-and-enforcement
activity occurs where marginal benefit and cost curves intersect. Anderson
and Hill argue that the contingency of factors influencing costs and benefits
explains why we observe varying degrees of definition-and-enforcement

activity and thus varying degrees of property arrangements covering the
spectrum from commons to private. But their model does not dispute

Demsetz's most fundamental claim: that increasing demand requires a
move away from commons property toward private property.47 Commons
property may be temporarily efficient, but in time, as the demand for scarce
resources inevitably increases, privatization prevails.4"
Robert Ellickson refines the cost-benefit analysis further, but implicitly
still shares in the fundamental claim regarding the demise of commons
property.49 Ellickson distinguishes among the advantages of individual
ownership in what he terms "small," "medium," and "large" events, each
with rather different cost-benefit analyses.5 ° He acknowledges the possible

merits of commons property only with regard to one category, that of large
events. Group ownership of land can sometimes be advantageous, he

explains, because of "increasing returns to scale and the desirability of
spreading risks." 51 But the examples he gives for cases in which economies
of scale and risk-spreading favor commons property-three pioneer

47. Similarly, Steven Cheung has shown that various property arrangements may be efficient
and that individuals therefore choose different contract arrangements under varying conditions,
though he has also maintained that this variation must remain within a private property regime to
achieve efficient outcomes. STEVEN N.S. CHEUNG, THE THEORY OF SHARE TENANCY 4, 158
(1969). Challenging other economists' conclusions that share tenancy is a less efficient system
than fixed rents, Cheung focuses on transaction costs and risk to develop a theory that explains the
divergence of property arrangements. Id. at 30, 63-77.
48. See also JAMES E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 69 (1997) (arguing that
although "in some situations commons work," scarcity generally "give[s] rise to conflict," and thus
"the general point"--the "obvious solution"-is "to link rights of use with rights of exclusion,"
namely, private property).
49. Ellickson, supra note 19.
50. Respecting small events, Ellickson identifies three basic reasons for the relative
efficiency of individual private property in terms of monitoring costs: Self-control by one person
is simpler than the multiperson coordination entailed by intragroup monitoring; detecting a
trespasser is less demanding than evaluating the conduct of persons otherwise privileged to use a
resource; and policing boundaries or carrying out other monitoring functions is easier for an
individual landowner, who will be more highly motivated than a member of a commons group.
Likewise, Ellickson identifies three advantages of individual ownership with regard to medium
events: Excessive dependence on coordination through a large number of transactions can be
avoided; cooperation becomes more probable because of relatively multiplex relationships among
neighbors; and dispute settlement arising out of medium events can be relegated to those persons
most likely to be informed about the controversy. Id at 1327-32.
51. Id. at 1332.
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settlements in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries 5'-are indeed exotic
and almost idiosyncratic, especially from the perspective of a modern
market economy.
Only a few economics-oriented authors have challenged Demsetz's53
underlying proposition, the most prominent of whom is Barry Field.
Field's insight derives from recent research in European social history that
strongly suggests that communal agricultural property was antedated by a
system that was more individualistic, carried out on small, individual fields
rather than in communal lots. Hence, Field suggests that property-rights
economists need to explain two opposite changes using just one causal

factor: They need to show how population growth in one period could
produce a shift from individual to common tenures, and later produce a

shift from commons to individual property. Field suggests that plausible
circumstances could be identified where developmental pressures
encourage greater use of common, rather than individual, property. 4 His
analysis generates some indeterminacy in the economic inevitability of
shifting to private property with increasing pressure on a resource. While a
challenge to the conventional economic wisdom, Field's move is only a
first step for our purposes.
To develop a theory of a liberal commons, we must consider the
possibility of successful management of commons resources not as an
intermediate condition but as an end state, and we must learn the
prerequisites for such success. Hardin, Demsetz, Anderson and Hill,
Ellickson, and many others have helped to establish a sense of the
inevitability of privatization and the necessary failure of commons
ownership. The economic literature takes us only so far in countering that

52. Id. at 1335-41.
53. Barry C. Field, The Evolution of Property Rights, 42 KYKLOS 319 (1989); see also Fikret
Berkes, Cooperation from the Perspective of Human Ecology, in COMMON PROPERTY
RESOURCES: ECOLOGY AND COMMUNITY-BASED SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 70, 79-82, 84
(Fikret Birkes ed., 1989) (arguing that cycles in intensity of resource use can bring cycles of
common-resource management, and describing Cree Amerindian hunting territories as an example
of "the evolution, demise and subsequent recovery (more than once) of communal resourcemanagement systems").
54. Field, supra note 53, at 319-20, 328. To see why, consider the impact of increases in
demand on the costs and benefits of establishing and maintaining a private property regime. As
Demsetz claims, the increasing value of output justifies some additional costs in creating and
maintaining a system of private property; the higher returns possible in a system of private property
justify the accompanying increase in exclusion costs. Demsetz, supra note 5. Field insists, however,
that this analysis is incomplete because it takes exclusion costs as given. But the effectiveness of
resources devoted to exclusion depends on the incentives that exist for encroachment, which are
related to the derived value of the resource. If the resource has no value, there would be little
incentive to encroach, and thus it would be relatively easy to exclude, other things being equal. So an
increase in the value of output could be expected to increase the incentive for encroachment, which
implies that additional resources are required to achieve the same effective level of exclusion that
obtained before. If this effect is particularly strong, it may overcome the effect identified by Demsetz
and lead to commons property as the ultimate outcome. Cf Field, supra note 53, at 329
(demonstrating similar ambiguous effects with respect to population growth).
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sentiment; political theorists push the debate further, perhaps too far in the
other direction.
C. Commons Tragedy as CommunitarianFoil
In sharp contrast to the role commons property plays in neoclassical
economic-legal theory, many political scientists (and some new institutional
economists) have come to celebrate another version of commons property.55
Political theorists have supplied a wealth of case studies of well-functioning
commons property regimes around the globe, thus demonstrating
empirically the falsity of claims (or assumptions) that commons property
regimes are bound to generate tragic outcomes, defined in terms of wasted
resources.5 6 They teach that neither privatization nor regulation is the only
57
way to conserve scarce resources and manage them productively.
However, these accounts also show-albeit often implicitly-that commons
success stories typically compromise individuals' right to exit, and
therefore they do not do much to help establish our claims for a liberal
commons.
1. From Taylor...
A recent debate between two leading scholars of this group, Michael
Taylor and Elinor Ostrom, illustrates our arguments. Taylor believes that
"[c]ommunity with mutual vulnerability is what endows some groups with
the means to regulate their commons endogenously." 58 For him, a
community is a more or less stable set of members with some shared
beliefs, including normative beliefs and preferences beyond those
constituting their collective action problem, who expect to continue
interacting with one another for some time to come, and whose relations are
direct (unmediated by third parties) and multiplex (concerning a range of
issues on which there can be give and take). Stable membership, continuing
interaction, and direct and multiplex relationships, Taylor explains, all
make mutual monitoring easy and cheap.

55. One focal point for this group of scholars appears to be the International Association for
the Study of Common Property (IASCP), which holds an annual convention drawing hundreds.
McKean, supra note 6, at 250 n.4.
56. Of course, there are also numerous counterexamples, where locking people together to
manage a resource has disastrous effects. To give one particularly poignant example, consider
United States policy toward Native American land holdings, which has led to a classic tragedy of
the anticommons. See Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J.
1163, 1213-17 (1999) (discussing the consequences of a federal allotment policy that prohibited
alienation yet did not provide any collective governance mechanism for managing land resources).
57. See, e.g., McCay & Acheson, supra note 28, at 7,9, 13.
58. Sara Singleton & Michael Taylor, Common Property, Collective Action and Community, 4
J. THEORETICAL POL. 309, 311 (1992).
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The success of commons property, in other words, comes exclusively
from factors within the group and is premised on the group's social
cohesion. Therefore, Taylor concludes, success also depends on a lack of
great economic or social differences among the community members.
Differences in income, wealth, or class positions, or in ethnicity, race, caste,
language, or religion, weaken or undermine his conditions for community
and thus threaten the success of commons property.59

2.

... to Ostrom

Ostrom claims, correctly in our view, that Taylor's story relegates the
commons to a marginal status in contemporary circumstances, irrelevant for
larger, heterogeneous, and changing sets of individuals. 60 Ostrom represents
another genre of commons theorists who are more useful for our purposes.
Strong community, she claims, is neither sufficient nor ex ante necessary
for solving resource dilemmas in commons property. Even heterogenous
sets of individuals may overcome the commons difficulties with the help of
proper institutional innovation and design, although if they do not develop
shared values, they will eventually fail.61 Ostrom studies institutional
arrangements that help groups break out of the commons trap. Thus, in her
celebrated book Governing the Commons, she demonstrates how these

arrangements may distinguish between cases of long-enduring commons
and cases of failures and fragilities. 2

Any attempt to devise a theory of the liberal commons must take
account of Ostrom's design principles. Before doing so, however, we must
consider an important question of relevance that arises from her work.
Notwithstanding her opposition to Taylor's extreme communitarianism,

59. MICHAEL TAYLOR, COMMUNITY, ANARCHY AND LIBEmRT 104-29 (1982); Singleton &
Taylor, supra note 58, at 316.
60. Elinor Ostrom, Community and the Endogenous Solution of Commons Problems, 4 J.
THEORETICAL POL. 343, 347 (1992). But cf Fred P. Bosselman, Replaying the Tragedy of the
Commons, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 391, 399-400 (1996) (reviewing ELINOR OSTROM ET AL., RULES,
GAMES AND COMMON-POOL RESOURCES (1994)) (" Mhe solution of common resource problems
becomes both more difficult and more important as the scale of the resource grows.").
61. Ostrom, supra note 60, at 347-50; see also, e.g., Lawrence Taylor, "The River Would Run
Red with Blood": Community and Common Property in an Irish Fishing Settlement, in THE
QUESTION OF THE COMMONS, supra note 28, at 290, 305-06 (distinguishing between "traditional
communities," which understand collective ownership as natural, rather than derived from discrete
decisions to cooperate, and "contractual communities," whose conceptions of community and
common property have more specific origins, and noting that contractual communities frequently
manage common resources through institutions and may be "equally 'close-knit"').
62. OSTROM, supra note 6, at 58-102, 143-81; see also Field, supra note 53, at 321, 335-40.
Field argues that both the exclusion of noncommoners (the costs of private property) and the
transactions among commoners (the costs of commons property) are carried out by the collectivity.
Thus, "we can look on political innovations as also having a distinct role to play in determining
efficient property institutions in a society." Field, supra note 53, at 337. More specifically,
innovations in institutions of internal common governance may facilitate commons property,
whereas innovations in the institutions of boundary maintenance and exclusion support private
property.
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Ostrom's genre also implies an important illiberal component that she does
not confront because of her exclusive focus on rebutting the neoclassical
economists' "tragic outcome" story. Ostrom's success stories, as well as
most others reported in the literature, include strong limitations on
alienability. In the purest case, there is no market in which rights to the
commons can be bought, leased, or exchanged. Rights are conferred only
on a particular class of eligible persons and may not be transferred to
persons outside of that class. In a few systems, the sale of shares is allowed,
but only to other eligible users of the commons, never to outsiders. These
inalienabilities strengthen the bonds among co-owners and reinforce their
rights in the commons, thus facilitating their cooperation.63

Ostrom and her allies do not even consider that the price of their
commons successes-which require locking people together in static
communities-may be too dear, particularly for those who place a high
value on individual liberty. If commons property can succeed only by
giving up the right to exit, a liberal commons is indeed an oxymoron. While
it is neither liberalism's sole characteristic nor a goal beyond compromise,
exit is nevertheless a crucial liberal value, as we discuss below. Because of
the role exit. plays in securing a free society, our theory of a liberal
commons cannot just adopt the findings of political scientists like Taylor
and Ostrom, although we will, to be sure, make extensive use of their work.
Rather, we must show that ownership and management of commons
resources is not doomed to tragedy as the neoclassical economists might
suggest, nor are its successes limited to illiberal environments as the
political theorists might imply.

III. A

THEORY OF THE LIBERAL COMMONS

We must show that a liberal commons offers something people want,
that existing legal regimes can be modified in realistic ways that would get
us there, and that the resulting commons ownership institutions can be, at
the same time, both liberal and prosperous. The first Section of this Part
explores the goals that a liberal commons must achieve: preserving exit
while promoting the economic and social gains from cooperation. While
these goals may appear to conflict, law can mediate them, but only if law is
understood to operate as a set of background norms, a safety net that can
catalyze trust in daily interactions. No individual legal rule matters so much
as the cumulative effect of law that can help generate social expectations
supportive of trust and cooperation. The second Section sets out the core of
our theory, the three spheres of action that any legal regime must address
and the rules it should adopt to achieve liberal commons goals. These three
features-the sphere of individual dominion, the sphere of democratic self-

63. See McKean, supra note 6, at 261-62.
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governance, and the sphere of cooperation-enhancing exit-constitute what
we call the general form of the liberal commons.
A. Identifying the Goals
We focus here on what may be called "meso" or mid-level goals, those
that are intrinsic to the general liberal commons form and that are amenable
to law reform. Application of the liberal commons form to any particular
institution, such as marital property, condominium associations, or close
corporations, would require considering two other levels of normative
goals. First, there may be "micro" nuanced values that inhere in the
particular institution being considered for reform in a liberal commons
direction. For example, any application of our theory to marital property
must account for deep cultural concerns with the ultimate collective goods
of marriage, such as intimacy, caring and commitment, and selfidentification. 6 Adapting the general liberal commons form to the marital
context may require some fine-tuning that would allow the accommodation
of these values. Other liberal commons settings, like condominium
associations and close corporations, may require responding to widely held
values particular to these settings. Second, there may be "macro" social
commitments that transcend the liberal commons form but necessarily
inform analysis of all such institutions. For example, concern for
nonsubordination of women and nonexclusion of minorities will necessarily
refine analyses across a wide range of institutions, including marital
property and common interest communities.65 These macro values may be
so widely shared and deeply held as to justify their imposition in a
particular liberal commons form even when they differ from or perhaps
conflict with the micro values of that form. Considered together, these three
levels of values-micro, meso, and macro-can help frame existing
institutions for commons resource management in their best light, and, by
doing so, point toward normatively attractive reforms.66 In this Section, we
focus only on meso goals, those that attach to the general form of the liberal
commons.
1. Preserving Exit
a.

Why Exit Matters

Exit is a bedrock liberal value, an essential element of a liberal
commons, and a core term of art in political and legal theory. First defined
64. Carolyn Frantz and Hanoch Dagan are exploring these issues in an article currently in
progress.

65. Michael Heller and Rick Hills will be considering the common interest community case in
an upcoming article.
66. See DWORKIN, supranote 10, at 52-53 (developing such an interpretive method).
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by Albert Hirschman, exit means "voluntarily leaving the effective
jurisdiction of the group,"6 8 whether that group is a nation, firm, or other
type of organization. Exit stands for the right to withdraw or refuse to
engage: the ability to dissociate, to cut oneself out of a relationship with
other persons.69 At a minimum, exit serves a protective function: "If the
group harms the interests of the member as the member sees them, then
leaving is a form of a self-defense." 7 In addition to its intrinsic importance,
the possibility of exit is instrumentally important. The threat of exit is often
one of the prominent mechanisms for disciplining social organizations and
optimizing the use of the commons resource:71 "The possibility of exit may
itself make the group responsive to the interests of its members," 72 and
conversely help make members become better cooperators within the
group.73

The multiple functions of exit in the commons resource context matter
to liberals because they "enhance the capacity for a self-directed life,
including the capacity to form, revise, and pursue our ends." 74 Generally,
liberals are committed to "open boundaries," that is, to the idea that people
should be able to leave the groups with which they choose to associate (and
sometimes they should also be able to abandon even their own current
identities).75 In some accounts, liberalism may even be defined as a theory
that adopts, justifies, and applies a strong commitment to geographical,
social, familial, and political mobility-all in the name of promoting the
individual freedom necessary to secure one's own personal happiness.76 No
doubt, a moderate restraint on exit-either an exit tax or departure delay,
for example-need not be considered offensive to liberalism. Indeed,
consistent with liberal convictions, such soft constraints may well be
necessary to ensure that the decision to leave is informed (not hasty and
ignorant) and sincere (not opportunistic).77 But a regime that makes exit
impractical through outright prohibitions or via rules that de facto prohibit
exit (including rules that impose prohibitive exit costs) or that unreasonably
67. ALBERTO. HIRSCHMAN, ExIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).
68. Leslie Green, Rights of Exit, 4 LEGAL THEORY 165, 171 (1998) (emphasis omitted); see also
id. at 177 (stating that "the core right of exit" is "the claim right that others not prevent one from
leaving the jurisdiction of the group").
69. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1400-09 (2d ed. 1988)
(describing the "dual character of associational rights," which include both the right to associate
oneself with certain persons and the right to dissociate oneself from certain persons). See generally
HIRSCHMAN, supra note 67, at 19-20 (suggesting the usefulness of economic concepts such as exit to
political scientists, and the usefulness of political mechanisms such as voice to economists).
70. Green, supra note 68, at 171.
71. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 67, at 22-25.
72. Green, supra note 68, at 171.
73. See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY 6-16 (1959) (discussing the concept of
negative liberty and its consequences for individual behavior).
74. Green, supranote 68, at 176.
75. See Michael Walzer, The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 18 POL. THEORY 6, 11-12,
15-16 (1990).
76. Id. at 21.
77. We develop this point in Subsection 1IH.B.3 infra.
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delay exit, is incompatible with the most fundamental liberal tenets.7" Exit
restraints that just treat individuals instrumentally cannot be legitimate
features of a liberal commons.
The critical virtues that exit enhances help to explain its status
throughout liberal legal regimes.79 For example, property law is generally
suspicious of restraints on alienation, even consensual restraints that limit
mobility respecting any particular resource." Often, statutes prohibit and
courts invalidate outright restraints on alienability; when faced with more
moderate restraints, courts may impose time limits or otherwise protect an
individual's right to exit.8 ' People generally do not perceive interference
with restrictions on alienability to be an unwarranted intrusion into freedom
of contract. Rather, the interference protects against agreements that
undermine a key purpose of contractual freedom, that is, securing
individual autonomy. 2
To be sure, liberalism is also committed to favoring contractual
freedom to craft whatever restraints by which people agree to abide. But
one can and should distinguish ordinary contracts-where liberal values do
not reject strong lock-ins-from property arrangements that encompass
much more of an individual's resources and social life. Regarding these
latter arrangements, the initial election of an illiberal exit rule cannot cut off
the liberal commitment to choice. Limiting people's ability to waive their
exit rights, in this context, is based only in part on a response to rationality
deficiencies, such as excessive optimism and lack of foresight. These limits
are also, and perhaps even primarily, premised on the commitment to a
conception of individual liberty that puts a high value on people's ability to
"reinvent themselves."

78. See Mark D. Rosen, The Outer Limits of Community Self-Governance in Residential
Associations, Municipalities, and Indian Country: A Liberal Theory, 84 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1099101, 1126-27 (1998).
79. Consider an example from outside the liberal commons context: Despite the tide of
fundamentalism in some parts of the world, certain rights of exit-such as the right to emigrate
from one's homeland-are now considered basic human rights, which are, as such, inalienable
and nonwaiveable. See, e.g., UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights, art. 13, G.A. Res. 217 (1I)(A),
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
80. Admittedly, this is not the only justification for these inalienabilities. Another important
justification comes from efficiency. See Heller, supra note 56, at 1199-201 (discussing the role of
restrictions on restraint on alienability); see also Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed,
PropertyRules, LiabilityRules, and Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,85 HARv. L. REV.
1089, 1111-15 (1972) (discussing the inefficiency of restraints on alienation but also suggesting
"instances, perhaps many, in which economic efficiency is more closely approximated by such
limitations"); Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970, 971-72
(1985) (setting out the efficiency argument for alienation and arguing against restraints on
alienation to achieve distributional goals); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienabilityand the Theory of
Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 932 (1985) (accepting that "unencumbered market
trades are desirable unless we can locate a valid reason for their restriction," while broadening the
range of efficient restrictions on alienability from the Calabresi and Melamed model).
81. See generally Heller, supra note 56, at 1199 n.174 (enumerating objections to restraints on
alienation).
82. On contractual freedom and individual autonomy, see CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS
PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 7-17 (1981).
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We can safely sidestep ongoing disputes among liberal theorists
regarding the precise role of exit, such as whether exit is, by itself, a
sufficient condition to preserve individual autonomy.83 For our purposes,
we assert only the modest, and we think uncontroversial, proposition that
some strong version of exit is a fundamental, core right in any theory worth
labeling as liberal.84 As we see it, exit enables individuals to determine their
own group associations and to remain in the groups they choose out of their
free choice only. In short, the possibility of exit allows individuals the
mobility that is a prerequisite for liberty.
b. Is Entry Like Exit?
Is free entry the mirror image of free exit, and as such also a core
element of the liberal commons? Only to a limited extent. We believe that
liberals should not be concerned with every limitation on entry. Insofar as
liberals are committed to pluralism and diversity85 and recognize the
86
significance of culture and community to personal identity, we must be
careful not to condemn or criticize every homogeneous community and
every exclusionary practice.87 Moreover, insofar as liberals are concerned
with groups that tolerate cross-cutting affiliations (and thus only partially
cover their members' associational worlds), a liberal commitment to
pluralism requires a multiplicity of groups, which in turn calls for allowing
groups autonomously to determine their own, divergent membership
requirements. 8 As Michael Wazer puts it, "we need to sustain and enhance
associational ties, even if these ties connect some of us to some others and
not everyone to everyone else." 9

83. Compare Chandran Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights?, in THE RIGHTS OF
MINORITY CULTURES 228, 238 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995) (highlighting the liberal view of cultural
communities as voluntary associations), with Green, supra note 68 (arguing that exit is not sufficient
to secure individual autonomy in groups).
84. Recall also that, even aside from liberal theory, exit is a value with many virtues,
including, but not limited to, serving as a disciplinary limit on organizations.
85. See, e.g., ISAIAH BERLIN, The Pursuit of the Ideal, in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF
HUMANITY: CHAPTERS INTHE HISTORY OF IDEAS 1 (Henry Hardy ed., 1991); JOHN KEKES, THE
MORALITY OF PLURALISM (1993); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986).
86. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS INTHE MORALITY OF LAW
AND POLITICS 155-74 (1994); Chaim Gans, The Liberal Foundationsof CulturalNationalism, 30
CAN. J. PHIL. 441 (2000); Avishai Margalit & Moshe Halbertal, Liberalism and the Right
to Culture, 61 Soc. RES. 491 (1994); Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in
MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25, 40-41 (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1994).
87. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., You Say You Want a Revolution? The Case Against the
Transformation of Culture Through Antidiscrimination Laws, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1588, 1592-614
(1997) (reviewing ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY

(1996)).
88. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Private Government (Sept. 25,
2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal).
89. WALZER, supra note 9, at 105.
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Accepting the asymmetry between exit and entry is important for our
theory of the liberal commons. Although we believe, with Ostrom, that
group homogeneity is not a sufficient or ex ante necessary condition for
commons success, nevertheless, we also know that well-functioning
commons regimes give paramount concern to nurturing shared values and
excluding bad cooperators.9" Tolerance towards limitations on entry can
help preserve the integrity and character (in terms of interests or values) of
the commons' existing members, and thus be instrumental to the success of
liberal commons regimes.9"
Although a liberal theory does not require free entry, we think that there
are two extreme types of entry limitations so troublesome that a regime
allowing either cannot reasonably be said to embody the constellation of
values generally considered to constitute liberalism. First, there are cases in
which a limitation on entry so sweepingly restricts alienability that it is
practically tantamount to a substantial limitation on exit.92 In these cases,
the liberal commitment to free exit, rather than the more tempered
commitment to free entry, condemns the limitation. Second, some
exclusionary practices and criteria-for example, a systematic exclusion by
communities of a minority group that is based on prejudice respecting
issues such as race, ethnicity, or religion-may well infringe upon
fundamental liberal values of equal concern and respect.93 Delineating the
scope of such prohibited classifications, as well as of any surrogates of such
classifications that should be likewise prohibited, is an important and
complex task, but well outside the scope of our project.94 For our purposes
here, it is enough to state that a liberal commons must always be careful not
to cross the fine line between permitted homogeneity of purpose and
prohibited discriminatory exclusion.95
90. See supra Section fl.C (discussing conditions for success on the commons).
91. See Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and
Community, 75 CoRNELL L. REV. 1, 50-53 (1989); Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and
Communities, 61 U. CuH. L. REV. 1375, 1375 (1994) (arguing that, within limits, a polity should
approve of the way residential associations "allow individuals with common preferences to gravitate
to a common location where they can pursue their conception of the good life").
92. For an example of such a limitation, see Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics
as Markets: PartisanLockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 671-74 (1998)
which describes how the Democrat-dominated Hawaiian government's prohibition on crossover
voting in election primaries, prohibition on write-in votes, and prevention of "party-raiding"
constitute significant barriers to entry into political competition and create prohibitive costs for
exiting the party.
93. E.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that state-court enforcement of a
racially restrictive housing covenant violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Alexander, supra note 91, at 38, 54-55.
94. Developing this point are Gillette, supra note 91, at 1397-99; and Hills, supra note 87, at
1592-614. See also Alexander, supra note 91, at 55-61 (advocating a legal regime of open-ended
standards for governing the question of the limits of group autonomy, in order to "create
opportunities for those inside and those outside to engage each other in dialogue"). See generally
Rosen, supra note 78 (suggesting the outer limits of community self-governance that may be entailed
by JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993)).
95. Should there also be a right to eject a member who was mistakenly accepted or to protect
against a member's later change of heart? In most cases, it seems to us that such a right would do
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2. Promoting Cooperation
a. Maximizing Economic Gains
While one goal of a liberal commons is to preserve the virtues that
come from protecting exit, the other goal is to achieve the economic and
social gains possible from cooperation. On the economic side, several types
of efficiency gains may be available from joint management and pooling of
resources in a commons, for example, economies of scale and riskspreading. 6 The familiar economic approach acknowledges that, in
evaluating "whether the resources are common pool or amenable to
privatization, particular natural resource configurations, technological
constraints, and transactions costs may make common property a superior
solution to private property." 97 Thus, with landownership, larger parcels

may sometimes be preferred over smaller ones: In the agricultural context,
larger parcels may economize on fencing and cultivation costs (especially
where specialized equipment is available);9" in urban contexts, larger
parcels may allow construction of more valuable projects. In addition,
where a number of people own land together, they may be able to divide the
risks of ownership. Because most people are risk-averse, risk-spreading
through common ownership may be efficiency-enhancing, as for example
with land holdings that represent a large and otherwise undiversifiable part
of individual wealth.
b. Recognizing Social Value
Alongside potential efficiency gains, people could prefer cooperation
simply to receive the benefits of working together, of taking part in a
successful collective enterprise.99 Cooperation, in other words, is a good, in

more harm than good: A group right to eject can easily be abused by the majority as an instrument
for exploitation or retaliation for nonconformism. Granting such a power to the majority may
upset the delicate balance between majority jurisdiction and the minority protection discussed
below in Subsection I1I.B.2. To be sure, we do not want to downplay the harm a bad cooperator or
a disgruntled commoner can inflict on a liberal commons. To some extent, this harm can be
mitigated if the other commoners have already developed a thick fabric of cooperative social
norms with corresponding social sanctions for violations. But we concede that this is no full cure.
This difficulty is one good reason for adopting the relatively permissive approach to group-entry
limitations that we suggest in the text above.
96. Ellickson, supra note 19, at 1332-44.
97. STEVENSON, supra note 21, at 70.
98. See ABHUIT V. BANERJEE, LAND REFORMS:"PROSPECTS AND STRATEGIES 2 (Mass. Inst. of
Tech. Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No. 99-24, 1999) (citing studies that suggest how large parcels
may economize on production costs).
99. See JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 187 (1989). Jon.
Elster argues that successful collective action is produced by a "mix of motivations--selfish and
normative, rational and irrational ....Motivations that taken separately would not get collective
action off the ground may interact, snowball and build upon each other so that the whole exceeds the
sum of its parts." Id.Carol Rose has helpfully suggested to us that our emphasis on the social value
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and of itself, in addition to its importance in facilitating economic success.
People value interpersonal relationships-they form associations and take
part in collective enterprises-not only for instrumental reasons as a means
to some independently specified end: "We human beings are social
creatures, and creatures with values. Among the things that we value are
our relations with each other."

100

Our relationships with spouses, children, friends, neighbors, coworkers, and other types of potential commoners have intrinsic value that
we often strive to promote.' 1 Participants in a group with a joint
102
commitment may perceive themselves as members of a "plural subject."
This perception stimulates a sense of unity, even of intimacy or closeness,
that human beings tend to find gratifying. 10 3 Liberal commons settings are
particularly suitable for furthering these types of social relationships
because certain tasks, like the common management of a given resource,
provide an opportunity to enrich and solidify the interpersonal capital that
grows from cooperation, support, trust, and mutual responsibility. 5 Indeed,
of cooperation can be reframed in terms of the synergistic (rather than merely aggregative) benefits
of cooperation.
100. Samuel Scheffler, Relationships and Responsibilities, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 189, 200
(1997). In a similar vein, Walzer notes, "Individuals are stronger, more confident, more savvy, when
they are participants in a common life, when they are responsible to and for other people." WALZER,
supra note 9, at 104.
101. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 91, at 26, 41-42 (pointing to the intrinsic good of the
experience of belonging that is based on a shared good or a shared resource); Ellickson, supra note
19, at 1345, 1395 (noting that companionship and the solidification of "mutual-aid relationships" are
potential benefits of living in a multimember household, and pointing out the satisfaction of "living
in a social environment that is consistent with [one's] ideology"); Henry Hansmann, When Does
Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99
YALE L.J. 1749, 1769-70 (1990) (concluding that worker ownership may bring noneconomic
benefits: the satisfaction of engaging in a communal activity; the elimination of the potential conflict
of interest between workers and owners; the psychological benefit of control over resources; and
training for democratic participation that may benefit society generally as well as the workers
themselves); Simon, supra note 6, at 1364 (praising cooperative housing as "creat[ing] a fairly
strong form of interdependence, as well as opportunities for collective action").
102. MARGARET GILBERT, LIvING TOGETHER: RATIONALITY, SOCIALITY, AND OBLIGATION

2, 8 (1996). For a succinct summary of the literature on collective agency, see Elizabeth S.
Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA.
L. REv. 1503, 1514-20 (2000).
103. See GILBERT, supra note 102, at 221.
104. Cf PENNER, supra note 48, at 181 (arguing that exclusive use-the core feature of
private property-suits an impersonal social situation).
105. Cf GILBERT, supra note 102, at 222-23 (noting that marriage may produce an intensive,
long-term fusion, ranging over an ever-increasing number of projects, and that it is exactly this
intensity and continuity of intensity that stimulates unity, closeness, and mutual trust); Robert
McC. Netting, What Alpine PeasantsHave in Common: Observationson Communal Tenure in a
Swiss Village, 4 HUM. ECOLOGY 135, 143 n.13 (1976). Netting notes that while most vineyards
and grain fields in the Swiss village of Torbel were individually owned, the community as a whole
owned a vineyard, a grain field, a church, and a dwelling where the priest lived. These resources
were used to support the priest, as well as to compensate the fire brigade and others who provided
special services for the community. Netting links the existence of this communal property to
community cohesion: "In these cases, communal rights to land and buildings that would
otherwise be private contribute directly to social solidarity and village integrity. In each instance,
the token communal resources are used to support social services and village-wide celebrations
that promote cooperation and emphasize unity." Netting, supra, at 143 n. 13.
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in certain settings, such as in some religious and cultural communities, the
commons resource may even form the center of a way of life that
profoundly affects the commoners' self-identity.1°6
c.

Reconciling Economic andSocial Values

In many liberal commons contexts, economic gains and social values
tend to reinforce one another. Interpersonal capital facilitates trust, which,
in turn, gives rise to economic success. And economic success tends to
strengthen trust and mutual responsibility. But we can imagine contexts in
which the imperatives of economic success and social cohesion conflict.
Any liberal commons must pay some attention to both fronts. Both are
intrinsically valuable and thus neither should be abandoned. Furthermore,
either total economic failure or the collapse of social cohesion will
effectively end cooperative resource management and likely yield a tragic
outcome.
But beyond this modest imperative, we do not attempt to come up with
any general formula for solving such conflicts. It would be incredible to
suggest that the relative importance of economic success and of social
cohesion is constant over the vast realms of life-from families to close
corporations-in which liberal commons regimes may be established.
Rather, we believe that setting the balance between these two happy
outcomes of cooperation-to the extent that they are in conflict-must be
context-dependent; that is, the balance should be informed by the applicable
micro and macro values. There are realms of life in which the commoners'
economic success is likely to play a rather major role (a close corporation
may be an example) and there are others (say, the family) in which a
significant degree of inefficiency may be a tolerable price for securing the
social goods of cooperation.
3.

Do Exit and CooperationConflict?

The two goals of the liberal commons-preserving autonomy through
exit and achieving economic and social gains through cooperation-may
work at cross purposes. This simple, troubling observation lies at the core
of the "tragedy of the commons" metaphor. The ownership and
management of commons resources may exemplify the most familiar of all
106. See, e.g., ANDREW GRAY, INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: SELFDETERMINATION INAN AMAZONIAN COMMUNITY 109-11 (1997) (describing the close identification
of land and other resources with individuals and groups among the Arakmbut of the southeastern
Peruvian rainforest); Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights to IntellectualProperty
in Indigenous Communities, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175, 194 (2000) ("The group product in
the indigenous society is the medium through which all tribal members, living, dead and unborn,
speak their voice and become a part of the tribal way."); Jeremy Waldron, Superseding Historic
Injustice, 103 ETHIcs 4, 19-20 (1992) (claiming that for some tribes and communities, land forms
the center of a present way of life and can be of religious and cultural significance).
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collective action problems,10 7 one often formalized as a multiperson
prisoner's dilemma with an incentive structure facilitating noncooperative
behavior and generating tragic outcomes." 8 If the story stopped there, it
would be rather disappointing because there would be no way people could
reach the economic and social gains potentially available from pooling
resources in a commons.
However, where people have repeat dealings-typically the case with
relationships among commoners-cooperation does prove possible, even
likely. As Robert Axelrod famously demonstrated with his tit-for-tat
strategy, people may cooperate even with prisoner's dilemma incentives
(and without side communication) once their interactions are turned into an
indefinite game. Axelrod defines his strategy to require "avoidance of
unnecessary conflict by cooperating as long as the other player does,
provocability in the face of an uncalled for defection by the other,
forgiveness after responding to a provocation, and clarity of behavior so
that the other player can adapt to your pattern of action." " As Axelrod
explains, this happy result "requires that the players have a large enough
chance of meeting again and that they do not discount the significance of
their next meeting too greatly." " The ability to remember and retaliate
makes noncooperative moves individually counterproductive, and thus may
induce self-interested cooperation, even in a commons.111
But this happy scenario may, in turn, pose a stumbling block for our
theory. Previous commentators noted that, for cooperative results to
emerge, the game must repeat indefinitely." 2 A repeated interaction with a
finite ending may still yield tragedy, because each participant knows that
the last move will resemble a one-shot prisoner's dilemma, in which
defection is the dominant strategy. Knowing that others will defect on their
last move creates a domino effect through earlier interactions, so that
defection becomes the dominant strategy for everyone from the outset." 3

107. "Collective action" is a generic term describing the difficulty faced by a group of selfinterested individuals where the promotion of their self-interest requires cooperation. Even if they
all agree on both their collective purpose and the best means to promote this purpose, they will
still face difficulties in achieving it, since for each and every one of them, the individual interest
supersedes their share of the collective good. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 2, 7-8,10-11, 16, 21, 51, 60-61 (1971).

108. E.g., OsTRoM, supra note 6, at 3-5; STEVENSON, supranote 21, at 20-27.
109. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 20 (1984).
110. Id. at 174.
111. Id. at 126-32; see also RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 145-50, 164-67 (1982)
("[Players may rationally cooperate in iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas,").
112. E.g., ANTHONY DE JASAY, SOCIAL CONTRACT, FREE RIDE: A STUDY OF THE PUBLIC
GOODS PROBLEM 63-66 (1989) (noting that the individual-maximization calculus under which it
works even better not to take advantage of others arises when there are continuing interactions with
the same players); Rose, supra note 45, at 51 n.49 (noting that the possibility of retaliation preserves
a cooperative regime on a basis of self-interest, but also pointing out difficulties with this theory).
113. See, e.g., R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 94-102 (1957).
For certain (partial) solutions, see HARDIN, supra note 111, at 173-87, 211-13, suggesting ways in
which varied, but overlapping, interactions can provide opportunities for meaningful sanctions, the
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Consider how a strong right of exit affects the likelihood of an efficient
commons, at least within the artificial world of game theory (assuming, for
4
the moment, voracious, unsocialized commoners)." Strong exit allows
each commoner an unwaiveable right to leave the commons at any moment.
But each commoner also knows that others can leave at any moment,
raising a serious concern for those who want to stay put. The stay-putters
worry what may happen between the moment the foot-out-the-door folks
decide to leave and the moment they actually exit. In the interim, the stayputters may continue to cooperate, but the foot-out-the-door folks are now
playing a transitory and short-lived game. The stay-putters may worry that,
during the interim period, which can happen at any time, the foot-out-thedoor folks will take advantage of them, either by overexploiting or
underinvesting in the commons resource.
Still, in many contexts, unilateral uncertainty regarding when others
5
might leave need not frustrate cooperation. Vigilant commoners can react
to noncooperative moves by retaliating promptly, thus limiting the risk of
exploitation and making cooperation stable. However, two features of longterm cooperation in managing commons resources make vigilant retaliation
an unsatisfying response for our purposes. First, the benefits to commoners
can vary substantially over time. Therefore, each potential stay-putter may
suspect that the others (the potential foot-out-the-door folks) will defect
precisely when they can realize particularly high benefits from the
commons resource. If defection at a given moment proves more
advantageous than continuous cooperation, then the possibility of
retaliating later may not be able to mitigate the harm that foot-out-the-door
folks can inflict with well-timed defections. Not wanting to bett 6suckers,
folks.
stay-putters may behave as if they too are foot-out-the-door
There is a second, more prosaic reason why strong exit threatens
commons prosperity. Commoners may have independent or exogenous
reasons to exit; they may leave because of familial, professional, or other
reasons that have nothing to do with timing advantageous defection. But
after they decide to leave for such reasons, the erstwhile stay-putters may
be tempted to behave like foot-out-the-door folks in timing their intended
exit: Once they know that they will soon depart, their incentive to cooperate
knowledge necessary to cooperate, and a rough simulation of an infinitely iterated prisoner's
dilemma game.
114. In the real world, commoners are not usually voracious and unsocialized. Indeed, the
opposite seems true. But the always real possibility of abuse suggests the role of legal protection:
It seems a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to sustain trust and cooperation in a liberal
commons setting. Our simple game theory mode of analysis helps puzzle through these
relationships.
115. For instance, in the antitrust context, collusive agreements can be stable. See RICHARD
A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES, AND OTHER
MATERIALS 336-38 (2d ed. 1981) (identifying conditions conducive to collusion).
116. Players in long but transitory games, that is, where all parties know the end point, may
be less prone to defecting because the symmetry of information somewhat eases the fear of
exploitation. HARDIN, supra note 11, at 145-50.
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is greatly diminished." 7 And all the other commoners face again the same
troubling question: Why restrain yourself now if the other commoners may
choose their moment to take the most and run? Again, even prompt
retaliation may not solve the challenge that strong rights of exit pose to
efficient use of a commons because retaliation cannot recoup all of the
losses imposed by the foot-out-the-door folks.
A theory of a liberal commons requires two elements: strong (but not
unlimited) exit and the possibility of realizing economic and social gains
from shared use of scarce resources. But simple game theory reasoning
helps formalize the familiar intuition that these elements may work at crosspurposes. The structure of interactions in a commons seems to offer only
partial solutions to the threat posed by exit. If so, then an efficient and
liberal commons may not be a realistic possibility. How can law resolve the
seeming impasse?
4. Putting Law in Its Place
a.

Law as a Safety Net That Catalyzes Trust

Consider for a moment the seeming paradox that an efficient liberal
regime of private property is itself, oddly, a type of commons held together
by virtue of the law's facilitation.1"' By constraining individual
opportunism, law proves effective as one mode of social organization that
helps overcome collective action problems inherent in creating and
maintaining private property. Using law to build a liberal commons is not
so different.
To start, we join with commons property scholars who have shown so
persuasively how political and social institutions can affect the costs and
benefits facing commons owners in their attempts to organize themselves. 19
They show how "generalized institutional-choice and conflict-resolution"
mechanisms together with "substantial local autonomy" can facilitate and
sustain commons property regimes."' 0 After getting to this point, however,

117. Notice the difference between the two reasons that exit threatens successful commons
property. The first reason requires a unique payoff structure in which the variations between gains
at different times are so great that defection destabilizes cooperation. The second applies more
broadly. If exit at a time between now and a given moment in the future is imposed (due to those
external reasons), the domino effect applies, and the party who is about to leave is likely to exploit
her superior information.
118. See Rose, supra note 45, at 51; see also EIRIK G. FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER,
INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL

ECONOMICS 76 (1997) (" [T]he existence of trust, reinforced with institutional safeguards, can
lead to the convention of private property and its social protection."); TAYLOR, supra note 59, at
44-48 (characterizing the features of law that provide security of property as a public good); Krier,
supra note 45, at 333 (observing the dependence of a private property regime on public regulation).
119. See OSTROM, supranote 6, at 190, 212.
120. Id. at 212.
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the existing literature invariably compromises exit.'' Because we are
committed, as we believe most people in our polity are, to the fundamental
right of exit, our path leads instead through the thicket of law toward a
theory of a liberal commons. Law can serve two functions: to provide the
infrastructure of liberal commons institutions and to supply antiopportunistic devices that reassure prospective commoners that they will
not be abused for cooperating. By adopting a straightforward collection of
substantive and procedural rules, liberal commons forms can encourage
prosperity and cooperation without sacrificing exit.
Law should be understood to work as a set of background rules, always
in operation, but seldom overtly manifest in the daily life of commons
resource management.'22 Formal law is often not powerful enough, by
itself, to establish directly the trust, cooperation, and mutual reliance that
any successful commons requires for the day-to-day routines of selfgovernance. Commoners generally will not deploy law on a regular basis
with each other, both because it would be costly and because people often
perceive recourse to law as unnecessary, unneighborly, or even hostile in
ongoing relationships of trust and cooperation.' 23 The routine operation of a
commons resource and the day-to-day cooperation among the commoners
are directly governed usually through informal, social interactions12 4
perhaps law-like in their own right-but not by formal legal rules. Social
norms and other modes of social organization and structure, not formal law,
govern most daily interactions.
With that caveat, well-designed background legal rules are nevertheless
crucial for the success of any liberal commons. As we discussed above, the
right of exit poses a fundamental challenge to commons success: For many
resources, the unilateral right to leave may invite opportunistic behavior
and cause people to be on their guard, distrustful, and overly quick to
retaliate. The background rules we propose can temper these instincts
primarily by creating a formal "safety net" that enables commoners,
without taking prohibitive individual risks, to gain the benefits that flow
from trusting one another. The simple existence of well-crafted background
rules, rather than their daily invocation, facilitates commoners' efforts to
establish and maintain liberal commons property.

121. See sources discussed supra Section II.C.
122. The background trust-building role we envision for law, as stated in the text, can only be
postulated here. It is quite another project to address the undertheorized understanding of the way
law generally (and not only the law regarding common ownership) affects people's everyday lives
and constrains or enables their decisionmaking.
123. E.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 157 (1993); ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON, ORDER WrrHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 60-64, 69,76, 274 (1991);

Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriageas RelationalContract, 84 VA. L. REv. 1225, 128587, 1294-95 (1998); Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law (Sept. 2000) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal).
124. See generally Symposium, Law, Economics, and Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643 (1996)
(including articles describing a range of contexts in which such norms form and operate).
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While commoners are unlikely to bother learning the rules of (lowvisibility) law, their ignorance of the law does not diminish its modest but
important role. The myriad details of the law do not matter individually, but
jointly they produce practices and experiences that in turn generate social
expectations. For law to affect behavior, we do not assume widespread
knowledge of any doctrinal detail, only that people generally believe that if
things turn ugly, the law will serve as one form of social organization that
protects them against extreme abuse and exploitation.
More precisely, the constellation of background rules that should
govern a liberal commons must minimize incentives to abuse the
interpersonal trust and cooperation necessary for success. Thus, liberal
commons property forms can enable individuals who appreciate the
potential economic or social benefits of common management of scarce
resources safely to enter into relationships of mutual reliance that they may
otherwise perceive as too risky. In an imperfect world, where we can never
absolutely trust one another, background legal rules can function as an
effective social organizational form that reinforces each commoner's trust
in others and willingness to cooperate without focusing on the grave
vulnerability that such trust can engender.'25 By generating the so-called
social capital of shared norms, including norms of self-control, trust reduces
the costs of monitoring and sanctioning activities.126
Background law that catalyzes trust is, for us, one essential alternative
to restrictions on exit that can also make commons ownership work
effectively. Some initial measure of trust-generated from the commoners'
self-interest, associational ties, or desire to engage, as the case may be-is a
precondition for a liberal commons. But building trust is also an outcome.
Just as trust secures success, so does success reinforce trust-a virtuous
circle in which trust, as Philip Pettit claims, "builds on trust" and may
"grow with use." 127
125. HARDIN, supra note 111, at 186 (" [T]he possibility of sanction is valuable for letting the
well-intentioned, who do not require sanctions, risk being cooperative on the secure knowledge that
those with whom they come to interact are similarly well-intentioned."); H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 193 (1961); JEREMY WALDRON, When Justice Replaces Affection: The Needfor
Rights, in LBERAL RIGHTS 370, 373-74, 376, 385, 387 (1993); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a
Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Searchfor Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1765, 1793 (1996) (" [T]he transactor may find it desirable to include terms in (he contract that are
the best terms if the other transactor turns out to be untrustworthy, while making extralegal
commitments ...that will govern the relationship if the other party turns out to be trustworthy.");
Carol M. Rose, Trust in the Mirrorof Betrayal,75 B.U. L. REV. 531, 535, 537-38, 540-41, 546, 550
(1995) (discussing bases for, and betrayals of, "semi-rational" or "doubting" trust).
126. See OSTROM, supra note 6, at 36.
127. Philip Pettit, The Cunning of Trust, 24 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 202, 209-10 (1995). Kahan
elaborates:
[The] behaviorally realistic model suggests the importance of promoting trust. Individuals
who have faith in the willingness of others to contribute their fair share will voluntarily
respond in kind. Spontaneous cooperation of this sort, moreover, breeds even more of the
same, as individuals observe others contributing to public goods and are moved to
reciprocate.
Kahan, supra note 123, at 2.
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The Penalty DefaultAlternative

Consider for a moment one possible objection to using law as a safety
net and as a catalyst: Facilitative default rules could be, in the long run,
counterproductive. 2 According to this view, by making cooperation
relatively risk-free, facilitative default rules could induce cooperators into
making suboptimal investments in screening other potential cooperators and
in learning how to cooperate better among themselves. Restated, the law
should not promote ownership and management of commons resources
unless the commoners could agree up front on their governance structure,
without the assistance of legal mediation. If the commoners could not agree
on initial terms, it is unlikely they could agree on much else, and therefore
it would be better from an ex ante perspective if potential cooperators did
not invest in a cooperative scheme that would be doomed to fail, in any
event. 29 This objection is pertinent for us because we argue that liberal
commons success must rely primarily on the parties' ability to cooperate
without the daily summons of legal rules. If this claim is right, then penalty
default rules-rules that make trust and reliance risky absent an explicit ex
ante agreement regarding the terms30of. cooperation-would be better than
the facilitative regime we advocate.
But insofar as commons resource ownership is concerned, the penalty
default objection is probably wrong, and the contextual tradeoff between
facilitating cooperation and encouraging caution leads us to prefer the
facilitative regime. To see why, consider how these two competing regimes
affect the behavior of ordinary, "mid-level" cooperators, the overwhelming
majority of whom must be the main target of a legal regime that purports to
encourage liberal commons property.' Given that learning to cooperate
better is itself a (second-order) collective good for the commoners, 3 2 it is
difficult to see how a regime of penalty default rules would ever generate
happy outcomes; rather, such rules would exacerbate the downward cycle
128. We are grateful to our colleague Jim Krier for challenging us on this front and helping
us respond to this challenge.
129. See James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The
Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 464, 478 (1995); see also Smith, supra note 35,
at 167 (making a similar claim with respect to scattered and semicommons property).
130. On penalty default rules, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts:An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989), which argues that
"penalty defaults are purposefully set at what the parties would not want-in order to encourage
the parties to reveal information to each other or to third parties."
131. A regime that encourages ownership and management of commons resources must focus
its effects mainly on mid-level cooperators, because especially good cooperators may well
succeed in effectively working together irrespective of the legal regime, and uniquely bad
cooperators would fall in any event. (Furthermore, to the extent that for mid-level cooperators
cooperation is itself a reward, but for bad cooperators it is not, the latter are unlikely to bid as high
as the former to join.) The only important prescription regarding bad cooperators is that the law
should allow-maybe even encourage-the others to exclude them. As the text below explains,
this exclusion can be achieved without adopting a regime of penalty default rules.
132. See Krier, supra note 45, at 337-39.
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of distrust that such rules assume to begin with. On the other hand, contrary
to the penalty default objection, even a facilitative regime actually does
not guarantee risk-free cooperation because law is always imperfect and
must always be invoked by an injured party.'3 3 Thus, the level of

underinvestment in caution and in self-education under the facilitative
regime is lower than the penalty default objection assumes and is, in any
event, outweighed by the benefit of allowing mid-level cooperators to play
the game at all.
Perhaps the penalty default argument has more bite when people are
involuntarily thrown together in a commons, as when inheritance leads to
co-ownership. In this view, the ex ante expected level of cooperation and
trust among involuntary commoners is much lower than that of voluntary
commoners. Therefore, the argument goes, involuntary forms of commons
should not presumptively include our ambitious apparatus for supporting
cooperation. Instead, one should expect trust to be absent and cooperation
to fail, and let failure take its course without intervention. Although we
agree that involuntary commoners are likely to be less inclined toward
pursuing cooperative goals, we disagree again with the penalty default
conclusion. Our point is not to force cooperation but to provide support if
the commoners want to give cooperation a chance. Preserving exit in such
cases ensures that our apparatus does not coerce, but facilitates an otherwise
remote likelihood of cooperation. 1" We see no reason to make the choice
for cooperation more difficult for initially involuntary commoners by
requiring that they exit and reenter to gain the benefit of cooperationfacilitating, trust-building rules.
In all, we view the role of law as constrained but indispensable. If the
goals of a liberal commons are to be achieved, law can play no more, but no
less, than a background role, by serving to catalyze and protect the trust that
governs day-to-day cooperation. With this understanding of the goals of the
liberal commons, and the proper role of law, we now turn to the core of our
theory.
B. The Three Spheres of a Liberal Commons

When people trade their precious, if illusory, "sole and despotic
dominion" for a share in a liberal commons regime, what do they get? First,
they generally retain the ability to make certain autonomous decisions
regarding use of the commons resource, the feature we call the "sphere of
individual dominion." Second, they gain a voice, along with their fellow
commoners, in collective decisionmaking regarding use of the resource, the
133. Rose, supra note 125, at 554-56.
134. Indeed, if failure is likely ex ante, one might understand cooperation, the failure to exit,
as an affirmative decision to remain (though, admittedly, a contextual decision not to exit does not
require affirmative action and therefore may be less weighty than an initial decision to enter into
cooperative resource management).
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feature we call the "sphere of democratic self-governance." And, third,
they retain the secure right to exit modified to respect certain community
concerns if they are dissatisfied or if they are no longer interested in
cooperating, the feature we call the "sphere of cooperation-enhancing
exit." These three features-the spheres of individual dominion,
democratic self-governance, and cooperation-enhancing exit--constitute
the ideal-typical or general form of any liberal commons.
It is the necessary confluence of these three features that the liberal
commons form highlights and the existing private/commons and
liberty/community binaries hide. No real-world institution incorporates all
these features; rather, we see approximations, more or less well-adapted to
the liberal commons goals of promoting the gains from cooperation while
securing the benefits flowing from strong exit.'35 Our discussion here of the
ideal-typical form and the rules we suggest in each sphere are necessarily
somewhat abstract because we are trying to unify analysis across a wide
range of institutions for commons resource management. Refining this ideal
type, then, becomes an iterative process: Part IV on co-ownership-and our
future work on family law, common interest communities, etc.-uses the
liberal commons form to evaluate the law, and that evaluation in turn helps
refine the liberal commons framework itself.
1.

The Sphere of Individual Dominion

In one sense or another, all three features of the liberal commons
elaborated in the following pages are aimed at facilitating trust and
cooperation (strengthening social values) and generating prosperous use
(maximizing economic gain). For methodological reasons, we start with the
most elementary background rules, describing a set of default rules that
govern the domain of individual action. These rules seek to ensure that
individual use of the commons resource does not yield tragic outcomes.
More particularly, these rules counter three forms of inefficient behavior
regarding commons resources: (1) overuse, (2) underinvestment, and
(3) wasteful struggles regarding the fruits and revenues that a commons
may produce. Together, these rules govern the sphere of autonomous
decisionmaking reserved to each commoner-the actions he or she may
take without seeking permission from fellow commoners. These rules apply
only absent a majority decision and are thus intentionally minimalist in
their scope and aspiration.
135. Recall that, to be analyzed usefully in the liberal commons framework, an institution
must be one in which the calculus of utility comprises incommensurable goals, participation is of
the essence, and the terms for exit matter. See supra text accompanying note 9. These admittance
criteria circumscribe the problems that any liberal commons form must solve, and hence
correspond with the three spheres we discuss in the text. The first sphere allows some divergence
between individual and social use; the second sphere promotes participation; and the third sphere
protects liberty.
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We assume that the democratic self-governance institutions of the
commons, discussed in the next Subsection, generate more refined
injunctions for beneficial use, and that the default rules we describe here
apply only to relatively marginal issues, those that do not justify or require
the invocation of collective decisionmaking.136 It is nonetheless important to
appreciate the way even these rules can facilitate trust, cooperation, and
efficiency.
a. Policing Overuse

Let us start with mechanisms that protect against overuse (leaving aside
nonlegal modes of social organization that may accomplish similar ends).
We see two complementary approaches to intervention: first, directly
regulating commoners' behavior through broad but vague default rules, and
second, indirectly encouraging proper cost internalization by establishing
tough default rules that give commoners the confidence to trust each other
in daily interactions.' 37
i.

DirectRegulation

Successful commons property regimes often create detailed, explicit
regulations restricting and channeling use. To ensure people take
appropriate care in exploiting the commons environment, such rules
typically are designed to be easily enforceable, for example, by imposing
escalating punishments."3 Furthermore, these regulations tend to be
cautious with regard to current exploitation of the commons resource. 13 9
136. An important question arises regarding the proper boundary between the sphere of
individual dominion and the sphere of democratic self-governance. We cannot provide a precise
answer to this question for all liberal commons settings because the outcome must depend on
contextual macro and micro values. But in Subsection III.B.2.b infra, we provide our general
guideline: The liberal commons favors majority rule in a broad realm of management and
investment (or divestment) decisions so long as the majority's decisions are not purely
redistributive, shifting utility from the minority to the majority. This general prescription signals
some "bias" in favor of democratic self-governance: In a liberal commons, the sphere of
individual dominion is residual whereas the sphere of democratic self-governance is dominant.
Such a bias does not collapse the liberal commons into the communitarian ideals of commons
property, however, because for the liberal commons, collective governance is democratic and exit
is preserved.
137. As an aside, the success of the medieval open-field system seems due, in part, to
communal regulation of the fields' use according to the two forms we explore in the text below.
Cf. Smith, supra note 35, at 132, 136-37 (terming the open-field system a "semicommons"
because of how it combines commons and private uses).
138. OSTROM, supra note 6, at 71-74 (detailing how access to a river for irrigation in villages
in Valencia was controlled by consistent monitoring by the farmers themselves and by elected
officials, with a tribunal determining violations and imposing fines); id. at 94-100 (addressing the
importance of graduated sanctions); McKean, supra note 6, at 256 (describing escalating
penalties-including exclusion or banishment in extreme cases-in the commons governance
regimes of certain Japanese villages); id. at 272-75 (describing the need for easily enforceable
rules).
139. McKean, supranote 6, at 272-75.
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Conservative limits on exploitation may impose some current costs, but
nevertheless result in overall efficiency gains. By shifting commoners'
discount rates so that future returns become more valuable, these rules
make continuous cooperation more attractive now.
A system of direct regulation requires detailed rules properly tailored to
the specific resource and its particular environmental, economic, and social
circumstances. Such a contextual and dynamic regulatory scheme can be
best produced (and adapted periodically) by the commoners, and thus lies
well within the sphere of democratic self-governance. The formal law, on
the other hand, is less likely to provide a successful default regime of direct
regulation that is sufficiently contextual and dynamic. If a default legal
regime aims to regulate activity directly, the best it will be able to do is to
handle a wide range of resources tolerably well. For example, direct
regulation can set general standards of reasonable use, such as a rule
restricting each commoner to uses that accord with the others' expectations,
and then leave the door open to local adjustments the parties may make to
tailor resource use to their specific circumstances. Practically, it can do no
more. Usually, the default rule of the direct approach involves ratifying
existing uses as a baseline and enjoining creation of major barriers to
reasonable new uses. Such vague default rules, although theoretically
plausible, are not likely to internalize costs very efficiently. Therefore, they
will not likely be effective anti-opportunistic devices of the sort we seek.
ii. Indirect Encouragement
To be effective, the operative background rules that prevent
overexploitation must be sharper and more precise. In particular, they must
guarantee that if trust collapses, then the costs of each commoner's use will
be properly internalized, neutralizing ex ante the incentives for overuse.
One plausible rule can be simply stated: Every commoner is liable to the
others for the fair market value of every use calculated pro rata (that is,
according to ownership share). Alternatively, in settings where the
underdeterrence concern is significant-notably where the visibility of
exploitation efforts is low and monitoring is relaxed, as in marriage"then liberal commons goals may be better achieved using a more stringent
remedy, for example, one based on recovering the benefits that the violator
gained from overuse of the commons. 4'
140. Where the visibility of exploitation efforts is low, fair-market-value liability may not
suffice to deter excessive use. There, potential violators can count on some measure of
underenforcement. They may reasonably expect some probability that deviance will not be spotted
if monitoring is relaxed, as we expect it to be, until eventually there is major deviance. Also, if the
pattern of deviance is detected late, evidentiary problems may arise because the exact degree of
earlier excess uses may be harder and more costly to identify, a cost that is aggravated if catching
extreme exploiters also requires settling the accounts of other, less extreme exploiters.
141. HANOCH DAGAN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT: A STUDY OF PRIVATE LAW AND PUBLIC

VALUES 18 (1997). Removing ex post the possibility of profit from detected infringements makes
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At first glance, both the fair-market-value and profits-based formulae
may seem impractical because calculating the liabilities for overuse would
impose high administrative costs. But recall that we intend the liability rules
to work in the background; we doubt that parties in a well-functioning
commons would routinely turn to such strict accounting rules. Commoners
would likely perceive a cold accounting for each use (or for each
investment) to be inappropriate in an ongoing relationship of cooperative
interaction, mutual trust, and group solidarity. 42 It would also be quite
expensive to administer. Rather, we expect to find, following Ellickson's
account, that daily interactions would be governed by a more informal,
rough mental account of outstanding credits and debits. 143 So long as the
aggregate account is not radically unbalanced and future interactions can
provide adequate opportunities for evening up, commoners may not be
concerned if particular subaccounts are not balanced.'"
So, the accounting mechanism we suggest is not intended to serve the
commoners on a daily basis. Its purpose and method is different, consistent
with our view of the trust-catalyzing role of law. Such a rule assures each
commoner that even if the commons breaks down, no party will be too
vulnerable to another's exploitation. By assuring enforcement of a precise
accounting if the commons fails, the law can enable owners to trust one
another and to rely on each other's cooperation in the meanwhile. 45 This
trust, to be sure, is not completely cost-free from the commoners'
perspective. Invoking the anti-opportunistic mechanism requires the
commoners to invest some amount in monitoring each other. Law can
facilitate the parties' trust, but it cannot-and probably should not-entirely
displace the need for each commoner to take some care not to trust others
too much.' 6 This indirect legal mechanism, even if imperfect, plays its role
by relaxing the parties' own monitoring reflexes, by making monitoring

overuse somewhat less valuable ex ante and thus may more effectively deter violations. To be
sure, even with this remedy there is still a chance that the infringement will go undetected or that the
other commoners will fail to pursue their claim, which makes the violator's expected gains greater
than zero. Nevertheless, the ability to recover the violator's gains makes detecting infringementseven past infringements--relatively more worthwhile to the other commoners. Id. Where the risk of
underenforcement is sufficiently high, even a "simple" profits-based remedy may not suffice. In
these (extreme) cases, the measure of recovery for preventing overuse should be increased so that
the exploiter's average damages will equal its profit. Technically, this would require that the level
of damages imposed equal the exploiter's profits divided by the probability of liability. See
Hanoch Dagan & James J. White, Governments, Citizens, and Injurious Industries, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 354, 421 (2000).
142. ELLICKSON, supra note 123, at 234-36.
143. Id. at 56; see also Bernstein, supra note 125, at 1796-98 (arguing that trade association
members rely on informal accounting during ongoing dealing but strict legal accounting during the
endgame).
144. ELLICKSON, supranote 123, at 56.
145. Omri Ben-Shahar, Rights Erodingfrom PastBreach, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 190 (2000).
Contra McKean, supra note 6, at 273-74 (arguing that successful systems "betray an intense concern
with... bookkeeping to keep track of contributions and withdrawals from the commons").
146. Rose, supra note 125, at 555.
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cheaper,147 and by lessening a too quick resort to formal law, the types of
actions that cause others to become suspicious and in turn undermine trust
and cooperation."'
b.

Preventing Underinvestment

Anti-opportunistic mechanisms regarding the parties' investment
decisions are the mirror image of "anti-overuse" rules. Investment in a
commons can be a public good with respect to other commoners. Hence, it
invites free-riding: Individuals may refuse to pay their share, motivated
solely by the expectation that others' efforts will generate the same good
free of charge (or at least more cheaply).149 Free-riding can generate
underinvestment that would harm any commons and would demoralize any
community. 5 ° Therefore, unsurprisingly, well-functioning commons
property regimes set norms that require commoners to contribute their
proportional share for necessary services invested in the commons.'
i.

Preservation

A default legal regime seeking to facilitate liberal commons success
should formalize investment-protection norms through a rule stating, first,
that any commoner may unilaterally undertake any investment--even if not
urgent and with no requirement of the other commoners' prior approvalreasonably required to prevent harm to the resource and to protect the
commoners' continued ownership or possession; and second, that the
147. The mechanisms we suggest make monitoring cheaper indirectly: By supporting trust,
they encourage the parties to spend less on monitoring, because each can expect the others to selfreport potential overuses.
148. Rose, supra note 125, at 556-57. There is another possible objection to the accounting
mechanism we propose. Our mechanism can never be perfect--and thus the overuse aspect of the
tragedy of the commons can never be fully overcome--because potential defectors will always be
able to get away with their opportunism if they overuse or damage the common resource in
unobservable or unverifiable ways. Cf Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An
Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 279-80 (1992)
(discussing the distinction between observable and verifiable information). This critique postulates
that there are many acts of individual commoners that would be impossible-or, more likely, too
costly--4o observe or to prove in court (even if observed). The critique further implies that a regime
of private property (the sole owner case) is free from this difficulty. We do not dispute that commons
property regimes face the difficulty of unobservable or unverifiable infringements. Ellickson, supra
note 19, at 1329 (comparing the effectiveness of barking dogs as a boundary-infringement device
with the difficulty of designing commons-shirking detection mechanisms). But this difficulty is not
wholly absent with private property: Trespassing must be policed and licensees monitored.
Therefore, if-or, better, in those cases where--the default rules we propose can overcome the
difficulties of collective action in controlling overuse by way of observable and verifiable acts, the
liberal commons is not different, in this respect, from so-called Blackstonian private property.
149. Richard J. Arneson, The Principleof Fairnessand Free-RiderProblems, 92 ETHIcS 616,
621-22 (1982).
150. See id at 622.
151. ELLICKSON, supra note 123, at 71-75, 275; OSTROM, supra note 6, at 49; McKean, supra
note 6, at 266-67.

2001]

The Liberal Commons

investing party should be entitled to an immediate pro rata contribution
from each one of the other commoners.
The rule protects a cooperating commoner from the others' possible
opportunism by insuring that parties who invest today will not be exploited
tomorrow. Like anti-overuse rules, our rule here serves a protective
function: to encourage parties to give cooperation a chance. The rule would
be too'cumbersome to invoke on a daily basis, so such ongoing accounting
would be handled through the ordinary informal norms that we usually see.
Given the possibility of disputes regarding which preservation measures are
"reasonably required," along with concern that some commoners may lack
immediate ability to contribute, the law can back the contribution rule we
propose with various structural devices, such as insurance-like funds
collected in advance that provide some assurance of payment when disputes
arise.
The investment-protection regime, like its anti-overuse complement
(and for the same reasons elaborated above), is supposed to function as a
background norm in the parties' relationship, so its mere existence
simultaneously encourages efficient levels of investment (by inducing
investments that would have otherwise been too risky and too open to freeriding) and inculcates productive trust among commoners.
ii. Improvements
In designing a liberal commons, we should take care before we impose
any contribution obligation.152 As noted above, that obligation reasonably
includes expenses aimed at preserving the commons as a whole.
"Improvements," however, are different from simple "preservation" though the line between them is murky. To the extent that improvements
can be adequately defined, they seem more likely to deviate from the
parties' original understanding of their common endeavor, so we cannot be
sure that commoners who refuse to participate are trying to free-ride, rather
than expressing their own subjective preferences and genuine valuations.'53
Including improvements in a broad obligation to contribute could offend the
notion of individual choice inherent in a liberal commons.'54 We think that
152. See generally Dagan & White, supra note 141, at 385-90 (discussing restitutionary liability
for unilateral conferral of unsolicited benefits).
153. As Saul Levmore explains, individual valuations are idiosyncratic because they depend
on varying abilities to pay for a good and on personal tastes. Levmore gives three exceptions
where the phenomenon of subjective devaluation would not occur: (1) the recipient has infinite
wealth; (2) the recipient is a profit-making enterprise where subjective preferences have little role;
or (3) the nonbargained benefit is easily translated into wealth. Unless those exceptions apply, one
cannot easily refute the recipient's claim that the recipient preferred to invest money in the
acquisition of some other benefit more clearly to the recipient's liking. Saul Levmore, Explaining
Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65, 74-79 (1985).
154. For the proposition that awarding restitution for unsolicited benefits in cases of varying
subjective valuations insults the liberal commitment to individual free choice, see PETER BIRKS,
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 109-10, 228 (1985); 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF
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such considerations justify postponing any obligation to contribute
respecting improvements until exit, in particular exit that liquidates the
commons and resolves concerns arising from conflicting subjective
valuations."5

To be sure, these "anti-underinvestment" rules are minimal and, if
applied broadly, rather crude and suboptimal. Thus, on the one hand,
improvements may be part of the parties' original understanding. And even
where they were not foreseen, improvements may be, in some cases, the
most beneficial course of action (for example, investing in insurance now
may be more efficient than covering uninsured liabilities later). Similarly,
there are cases in which even repairing a56 resource is a losing proposition;
such a resource is best left to deteriorate.

These defects of our default rules would be fatal if they were intended
to apply to a wide range of investment decisions. However, recall that these
rules apply only in the sphere of individual dominion, that is, absent a
majority decision on preservation or investment. They constitute the
(limited) realm of action in which any single commoner can act
autonomously on behalf of the group. Given that a more ambitious regime
regarding investments and improvements is well within the sphere of
democratic decisionmaking that we propose, it is reasonable to restrict the
realm of individual choice only to undisputed investments.'57 Crude as it is,
the preservation-improvement divide seems good enough given its limited

task.

REMEDIES § 4.9(2) (2d ed. 1993); John D. McCamus, The Self-Serving Intermeddler and the Law
of Restitution, 16 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 515, 520 (1978); and Mitchell Mclnnes, Incontrovertible
Benefits in the Supreme Court of Canada: Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Canada; Peel
(Regional Municipality) v. Ontario, 23 CAN. Bus. L.J. 122, 123, 128 (1994).
155. Levmore explains:
In partition the property is generally reduced to monetary terms, often by
sale .... The recipient, whose share of the improvement's value is deducted from his
share of the property's total value, cannot claim to have been forced to purchase a good
that he does not value, because he has received in partition the monetary equivalent of
his share of the improvement.
Levmore, supra note 153, at 78. This rule leaves a commoner who invests in improvements and
exits early with no right of contribution. But, as the text above explains, any other rule would
leave the other commoners too vulnerable to uncalled-for impositions of benefits. And, as we
indicate below, a commoner who wishes to initiate a common investment in the resource can and
should resort to democratic self-governance mechanisms.
156. See Merritt B. Fox & Michael A. Heller, Corporate Governance Lessons from Russian
Enterprise Fiascoes, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1720, 1727-33 (2000) (explaining how nonpreservation can
be efficient and giving colorful examples of value-destroying Russian enterprises).
157. In other words, until the community can reach some agreement on how risk-averse it is
going to be, our rules should assume that it is maximally risk-averse, so that individual investment
is reimbursable only when it can be characterized as a protection against erosion. In such a case,
differences in subjective valuations are unlikely.
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Sharing Fruits and Revenues

Finally, we take up the problem of distributing the products of a
commons. A basic principle that complies with the injunctions against
overuse and underinvestment is that fruits and revenues should be
distributed in proportion to each commoner's ownership share.158 But what
should be the rule where the revenues or fruits are not produced by all the
commoners, but rather by one (or a few) of them? How should fruits and
revenues be divided when a commoner makes an autonomous decision to
use the commons resource?
Three solutions come to mind as default rules. One rule would allow
the laboring commoner to keep the entire net profit after paying the others
the fair market value for the use of their shares. A second, diametrically
opposed possibility is to give the laboring commoner a fair market return
for the labor and distribute the net profits among all commoners (including
the laborer) according to their respective ownership shares. Third, an
intermediate possibility would be to allow the laborer to capture fair market
value of the labor as well as a proportional share of net profits attributable
to the labor, with all commoners (including the laborer) splitting the
remaining surplus.' 59

We see no general way to decide among these approaches. To the
extent that we are concerned mostly with policing against underinvestment,
the first rule seems preferable to the second (and, to a lesser degree, the
third)."W But, as we indicated above, the second rule performs best in
ameliorating overuse. Also, the second rule (implicitly) conceptualizes the
labor that any member invests in the commons as invested on behalf of the
group, and thus seems better designed to inculcate the sense of common
undertaking crucial for a well-functioning commons. While choosing
among these choices requires the sort of context-dependent analysis
attentive to micro and macro values that we discussed earlier, all the

158. Such is indeed the practice of successful commons regimes. McKean, supra note 6, at
264-65.
159. Assume, for example, that there are two commoners, that the fair market value for using
the resource as a whole (say, a parcel of land) is 40, that the fair market value of the pertinent
labor is 10, and that the resulting net profit is 100 (after deducting all expenses, including the 10
in labor paid back to the laboring commoner). The first option would give the passive commoner
20 (50% of the fair market value of the parcel's use), and leave the laborer 80. The second rule
would give each party 50 of the profit (so that the laborer does not get any special benefit). The
third rule would allocate 20% of the net profits to "work" and 80% to "land," thus allowing the
passive commoner to receive 40 (50% of what has been allocated to "land") and the laborer 60
(50% of what has been allocated to "land" as well as that part of the net profits that has been
allocated to "work").
160. Lawrence Berger, An Analysis of the Economic Relations Between Cotenants, 21 ARIZ. L.
REv. 1015, 1021-22 (1979) (describing the first rule as "clearly aimed at the reward of his [the
owner's] present efforts in maximizing the utility of the land"); Robert P. Merges & Lawrence A.
Locke, Co-Ownership of Patents: A Comparative and Economic View, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'Y 586, 595-96 (1990) (preferring the first rule for co-ownership of patents for similar
reasons).
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choices can fall within the range bounded by the liberal commons
framework.
2.

The Sphere of Democratic Self-Governance
a.

The Virtues of Mobilizing Voice

So far, we have focused on mechanisms that counteract the potentially
devastating effects that individual autonomy may have on the efficiencyeven the viability-of commons ownership. At a minimum, within a sphere
of individual dominion, owners can benefit from the commons resource.
Now we become more ambitious and explore affirmative ways to support
the commoners' cooperation, starting with possible rules for democratic
self-governance. These rules can help potential commoners capture both the
economic benefits that a viable commons engenders (pooling, joint
management, risk-spreading) and the social gratifications it generates (the
psychological rewards of belonging, membership, and collective action).
Recall that in many circumstances the economic and the social goods are
intimately related because efficiency, trust, and cooperation tend to be
mutually reinforcing.
Our prescriptions draw on findings from social science studies of
successful, though illiberal, commons. These studies suggest to us that
democratic self-governance with a large role for majority rule is preferable
to unanimity rules. By requiring complete agreement on management issues
and by emboldening holdouts, unanimity rules may lead to anticommons
tragedy, that is, mutual vetoes that waste a resource through underuse."'
We believe a democratic regime-appropriately modified to work in our
liberal framework-would best serve the individual and the group in
managing a commons resource in a way that maximizes efficient use and
enriches social relationships. Our regime gives voice to each individual
commoner and gives the commoners as a group the power to tailor
management and use of the commons resource to changing environmental,
economic, and social circumstances.
The mechanisms we propose amplify each commoner's ability to
change commons management from within. Resorting to "voice," rather
than immediately moving to "exit," requires disgruntled parties to have
some measure

of loyalty

toward their

fellow commoners.162

The

predisposition to loyalty, however, is not sufficient absent structural
arrangements that facilitate effective voice. 63 As Hirschman explains, "the
decision whether to exit will often be taken in light of the prospectsfor the
161. Heller, supranote 32, at 622-26 (explaining how the anticommons tragedy operates).
162. HIRscI-uMAN, supra note 67, at 77 (stating that loyalty makes exit less likely and increases
the likelihood of voice).
163. Id. at 82 (" While loyalty postpones exit its very existence is predicated on the possibility of
exit.").
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effective use of voice." '64 Furthermore, he notes that "voice is essentially an

art constantly evolving in new directions." 165 Therefore, so long as strong
exit is possible-and we insist that it always be possible-exit proves an
easy response to dissatisfaction, and it tends to dominate voice.1 66 A default
regime of democratic self-governance that promotes participation is
required to direct commoners to opt for voice first and to use exit only as a
last resort.
Voice is also an important medium for community-building.
Deliberation over daily decisions concerning the management of the
commons resource affords commoners an opportunity to engage in
dialogue. In this dialogue, the commoners may attempt to synthesize their
divergent experiences and preferences while reaching a collective
decision.167 Such experience is a means of socialization, one that helps
refine the commoners' values and inculcates collective commitments. Thus,
the sphere of democratic self-governance is significant not only because it
may result instrumentally in more efficient decisions. Democratic selfgovernance is also important to inculcate the noneconomic goal of
cooperation, enriching the commoners' interpersonal relationships and
solidifying their interpersonal capital. Democratic self-governance requires
attention to both jurisdictional boundary norms and procedural rules.
b. JurisdictionalBoundary Norms

Successful commons regimes, Ostrom reports, are characterized by
"collective-choice arrangements" that permit most affected individuals to
"participate in modifying the operational rules." 168 These arrangements
allow that "the individuals who directly interact with one another and with
the physical world can modify the rules over time so as to better fit them to
the specific circumstances of their setting." "169
Applying Ostrom's prescription within a legal regime for a liberal
commons is not easy. In particular, difficult decisions arise concerning how
best to determine the boundaries of group jurisdiction, that is, the scope of
decisions governed by a democratic governance regime. On one side, the
need for dynamic management and the problem of anticommons tragedy
both point toward a relatively broad majority-rule jurisdiction. Broad
majority-rule jurisdiction also seems to correspond well with a social
context of trust and cooperation, one that understands the group, rather than
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 37.
Id. at 43.
See id. at 36-43.
Cf Jeremy Waldron, Legislators' Intentions and Unintentional Legislation, in LAW AND
INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 329, 346-48 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995) (arguing,
based on Aristotle, that pooling of experiences and perspectives produces better decisions than
any one individual could reach alone).
168. OSTRoM, supra note 6, at 93.
169. Id.
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its individual members, as the ultimate owner of the commons resource. On
the other side, however, a liberal commons-like liberal regimes
generally-must be aware of the risks of majority rule and set jurisdictional
boundaries to mitigate these risks. Broad majority rule easily turns into
minority exploitation, especially if it extends the jurisdiction of the
majority, as we think it should, to the most significant decisions concerning
the management of the commons resource. And the risk of minority
exploitation tends, as we have seen, to frustrate ab initio the possibility of
trust and cooperation and instead to make exit the commoner's dominant
route to protecting autonomy. Therefore, a grant of broad jurisdictional
scope to the majority must be limited by protections against abuses arising
from that broad jurisdiction.
These two guidelines may seem vague and contradictory, but we think
that they can be reasonably clarified. The goal is to prescribe jurisdictional
boundaries that would minimize conflict between majority and minority
interests. 7 ° One approach could be to allow majority rule in a broad realm
of management and investment decisions-including giving the majority
the power to lease or mortgage the commons resource or to make extensive
and substantial investments (or to decide upon divestment)-so long as the
majority focuses on increasing the size of the collective utility pie. Such an
increase in majority power, however, increases the risk that the majority
will exploit the minority, so we would also prescribe sharper limits on
majority sovereignty whenever decisions are more easily characterized as
redistributive, particularly when they shift utility from the minority to the
majority.17 1

170. These boundaries have been extensively debated in many contexts, such as procedures for
granting variances from public zoning schemes, for judicial review of decisions by residential
associations, or for judicial review of decision rules in partnerships or close corporations. E.g.,
Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994) (clarifying the process for
decisionmaking by condominium associations and the applicable standards of court review);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 6.13(2) & cmt. a (2000) (discussing the duties
of a condominium association to its members and standards of judicial review of condominium
association decisions).
171. Notice that the rule against purely distributive majority decisions protects both shifting
and stable minorities. This rule would invalidate, in other words, not only decisions that seize an
opportunity to rip off one or a few commoners who are, for some reason, isolated at a given
moment. It also invalidates decisions with no sound utilitarian basis that systemically disfavor the
preferences of a more stable minority. On the other hand, a stable minority is not protected, and
should not be protected, where such a utilitarian basis exists. The meaning of majority rule is that,
so long as the procedural safeguards discussed below are observed, the majority can, for example,
legislate aggregate-utility maximizing rules regarding the use of the resource even if these rules
systematically correspond to the majority's preferences. Absent an intent to injure the minority, a
majority is allowed to make decisions that benefit itself much more than they benefit the minority,
even when an alternative decision would benefit all equally, but to a lesser extent. To be sure,
there may be contexts in which micro or macro values outside the liberal commons framework
could point toward more egalitarian solutions. In these contexts, applying a strict utilitarian test
could undermine trust by giving the minority the impression that they are inferior or that they are
the suckers. But in many other contexts-where egalitarian commitments are not in play-a
utilitarian calculus seems to work tolerably well.
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A knotty problem arises in evaluating the validity of a majority decision
to leave the commons resource unused. What counts as the baseline of use
or nonuse is a difficult question that has been extensively debated in the
nuisance, takings, and land use literatures,172 and will not be recapitulated
here. In most cases, however, a decision to stop using the commons can
reasonably be deemed outside the domain of the majority rule, because it
does not usually maximize the commoners' utility and is relatively more
likely to be a strategically motivated move to impair the minority's welfare
expectations. A distributive intention to freeze the minority out should
render the majority's decision illegitimate; thus the application of majority
decisionmaking there would be invalid. But a majority may be able to
redeem its nonuse decision if it can show utility-maximizing reasons.
In many cases, a utility-maximizing reason could be based on an
efficiency calculus, such as a showing that market conditions exist under
which current use would generate losses, or a demonstration that a "timeout" is economically useful for paying off debts and searching for
alternative low cost uses. 173 Efficiency, to be sure, should not be the obly
consideration that can legitimate majority decisions. Other utilitymaximizing considerations-such as environmental conservation, a simple
preference for realizing revenue later, or different levels of risk tolerancecan also render majority decisions legitimate. But making an efficiency
showing suggests, at least to a point, that the majority decision is not
motivated by strategic exploitation of the minority. In those unusual cases
where judges or other arbiters are called in, they may be able to improve on
an efficiency analysis by also evaluating evidence more directly related to
commoners' subjective utility functions. Judgments about subjective utility
are bound to require complicated assessments because utility is both
wealth-dependent and taste-dependent. But messy as these judgments are,
they are no different from myriad other rules throughout the law that
invoke-usually implicitly-utilitarian balancing.
Finally, we do not privilege the original intent of the founding
commoners regarding the majority's decisionmaking jurisdiction (unless, of
course, such intent has been enshrined by certain constitutional
agreements). Success in the liberal commons context-as with private
and commons property-requires dynamic adjustments to changing
circumstances. Hence, there is always a chance that the preferences of the
majority will, at some point, substantially shift away from those of certain

172. E.g., Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of
Takings, 112 HARv. L. REv. 997, 1011-12 (1999) (discussing when compensation is appropriate in
takings cases based on a nuisance rationale); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundationsof "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 119697 (1967) (same).
173. Furthermore, it may well be that in such a case it is the minority's insistence to continue
an inefficient (and positively harmful) use that is strategic.

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 110: 549

minority members.174 So long as the minority has not been exploited-in
or
motivations
redistributive
prohibited
absent
words,
other
that
consequences-and given the minority's ability to exit, we do not think
the jurisdictional boundaries for democratic self-governance should
incorporate any conservative bias.
c.

ProceduralNorms

Margaret McKean provides a rich account of procedural norms for
democratic self-governance. In successful commons regimes, she reports,
commoners "convene regularly in a deliberative body to make decisions
about opening and closing the commons," set harvest dates, decide "rules
governing the commons," and also "adjudicate conflicts" among
themselves.' 75 These bodies, as she describes them, seem to operate
typically along republican democratic lines.7 6 Not only is power
decentralized so that there is no hierarchy separating leadership (even if
elected) from citizens, 17 7 but also there often appears to be significant
emphasis on collective deliberation. To ensure adherence to the decisions
the group adopts, deliberative bodies pay attention to the views of all
Although formally majoritarian, these
eligible users of the commons.'
79
bodies in practice usually foster consensual decisionmaking.1 Democratic
governance operates as a background rule, while daily decisionmaking in
the absence of deeply held dissent is governed by a social norm of
unanimity. This background/operational split legitimates and promotes
consensus but does not create a formal anticommons structure, with its
attendant tragedy.
Republican democratic governance can be viable only in social
environments characterized by trust and cooperation. In other settings, such
as the paradigm of a public corporation, republicanism may be both
unnecessary and too costly. A hierarchical governance structure may better

174. See Gillette, supra note 91, at 1425 (describing how changing circumstances may
frustrate some homeowners' original expectations in a housing association).
175. McKean, supra note 6, at 258. These bodies had reasons to convene other than
management of the commons. As McKean explains, this made management more efficient by
lessening the transaction costs of assembling for these purposes. Id. at 260.
176. Id. at 260-61. See generally Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J.
1493 (1988).
177. See Ellickson, supra note 19, at 1350.
178. McKean, supra note 6, at 260-61. As McKean explains:
Disgruntled violators... could begin to free-ride.., or to shirk... if they felt
that the maintenance of the commons was no longer in their interest because the rules
were unfair. And they could free-ride as individuals even if they could not overcome
the collective action dilemma in order to demand changes in governance of the

commons.
179. Id. at 261.
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facilitate the parties' collective action.' 80 But notice again that republican
governance in the appropriate social context is more likely to develop the
trust and cooperation it requires and to facilitate and encourage members'
participation. Participatory democracy can intensify the parties'
interpersonal relations; so republicanism, with its attendant limitation on the
size of the commoners' group, is an important institutional mechanism for
community-building. Interpersonal relations and community, in turn,
reinforce trust and facilitate cooperation.
These lessons can be incorporated into a legal regime of a liberal
commons. Along with recourse to majority rule rather than to
administration by elected officials, a liberal commons regime committed to
republican democratic governance would require prescriptions respecting
disclosure, consultation, and fair hearing. Before majorities act, they should
disclose relevant facts that arguably justify the proposed action and make
room for open discussion by dissenting parties in a forum where all sides
must listen to opponents' views and give reasons for their stances. Finally,
minority complaints of due process deprivations or substantive exploitation
should be capable of triggering mediation or judicial intervention.
These mechanisms significantly facilitate successful liberal commons
property. Procedural safeguards calm the concern of the parties that others
will maneuver behind their backs. Such mechanisms also can recruit the
judiciary to support the parties' cooperation by serving as a forum for
dispute resolution that can "provide solutions that permit [them] to end
their quarrels and to get on with their lives."' 8 And where no such
reconciliation is possible, a court can be advised to order dissolution of the
commons, because for hostile parties, ownership and management of
commons resources is bound to yield tragedy. Finally, the requirement of
open-minded consultation-although difficult to enforce because the
majority can often carry it out in a purely superficial way-facilitates
republican social norms because it provides commoners with standards and
guidelines for conduct and judgment they each can expect the others will
generally follow in a social context generally governed by cooperation and
182

mutual trust.

180. See Henry Hansmann, Condominium and Cooperative Housing: TransactionalEfficiency,
Tax Subsidies, and Tenure Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 25, 34-36 (1991) (describing how landlords,
contracting separately with each tenant, may be better able to maximize aggregate tenant preferences
than cooperatives or condominiums).
181. Steven D. Smith, Reductionism in Legal Thought, 91 CoLuM. L. REv. 68, 71 (1991)
(discussing the dispute resolution function of law).
182. Cf HART, supra note 125, at 79-88 (discussing law as a source of reasons for action);
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Richard N. Pearson, Implementing FederalEnvironmental Policies: The
Limits of Aspirational Commands, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1429 (1978) (describing the difficulty of
controlling behavior through "aspirational commands" from legislatures or courts).
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Promoting Tailor-MadeAdjustments

The rules we have discussed so far provide a starting point for people
who inadvertently become commoners and for those who would voluntarily
become commoners if they did not have to incur the costs of customtailoring their default legal regime through contract. But for commoners
who can bear some contracting costs, background rules supporting freedom
of contract can provide another, simple method of legal facilitation for a
successful commons.
To prosper, the commoners must be relatively free from the authority of
outside bodies in managing the commons, a freedom McKean calls
"independent jurisdiction." 183 Providing "substantial local autonomy" 184 is
an easy, but crucially important, way to supplement the more active
methods of commons ownership facilitation we have already discussed. The
web of default background rules-significant up to a point-cannot by its
nature be sufficient for every case of liberal commons property, because
each resource carries unique features.
Therefore, alongside the law's active support for commons ownership
via anti-opportunistic and institution-building rules, the law should also
offer what may be called passive support; that is, the law should reflect a
liberal approach respecting the content of any private "constitutional
arrangements" commoners may wish to adopt. So long as exit is
appropriately preserved (within the limits set below), and provided third
parties are not injured, 85 the law should allow people to agree ex ante on
whatever constitutional arrangements they prefer respecting rights and
obligations regarding the resource, its management and use, or rules for
dissolution. By adding a liberal approach to contracting, people can tailor
their default rules so that they are ever more responsive to particular
6
resource needs, technological changes, and evolving local norms.'1
3.

The Sphere of Cooperation-EnhancingExit
a. The Many Faces of Exit

Appropriate mechanisms of anti-opportunistic guarantees and
democratic self-governance begin to move ownership and management of
commons resources away from their seemingly tragic predicament; wellcalibrated cooperation-enhancing exit completes the story. Unlike commons
183. McKean, supranote 6, at 259.
184. OSTROM, supranote 6, at 212.
185. A possible limitation could include protecting against the negative externalities that may
arise from excessive fragmentation of property rights. See Heller, supra note 56, at 1173-74.
186. Private constitutions raise several questions that cannot properly be addressed here,
regarding both the outer limits of freedom of contract (especially in contexts that may raise
concerns of systematic exploitation) and the possibility of unwritten constitutions.
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success stories that sacrifice exit to build community, a liberal commons
preserves a commitment to individual exit. Indefinite restrictions on exit
cannot be legitimized in a liberal commons.
Exit, however, is not a unitary concept, although it is frequently and
mistakenly treated as such. Sometimes, freedom to alienate one's share is
sufficient to protect exit; other times, nothing short of dissolution will dodissolution rules include, to name a few examples, partition in coownership law, divorce in family law, termination of trusts or partnerships,
and liquidation of corporations. Furthermore, for both alienation and
dissolution, there exists a range of mechanisms that serve communitypreserving functions without substantially compromising liberal
commitments. These mechanisms help insure that the exiter's decision is
informed (not hasty and ignorant) and sincere (not opportunistic), thus
refining the class of exit decisions that are consistent with preserving
cooperation and that should be protected from a liberal standpoint.
b. RestraintsCan Enhance Cooperation

Just like rules governing daily life in a commons, exit rules do not serve
as operative regulatory norms. But they can serve, as in the spheres of
individual dominion and democratic self-governance, as background rules
whose mere existence protects the commoners from defection, abuse of
trust, and exploitation. If so, cooperation-promoting exit rules may be tuned
so that they contribute to commons ownership success and perhaps even
support its establishment ex ante. To function as anti-opportunistic
mechanisms, alienation and dissolution rules should safeguard commoners
from unjust deprivation of utility by other commoners.187 Hence, these rules
should contain an injunction against redistribution, ensuring a scrupulous
allocation of the resource or its worth corresponding to the parties' initial
(and subsequent) investments.
Liberal commons settings include forms where the initial entry can
range along a spectrum from involuntary to voluntary. For example, the
classic involuntary forms are when heirs inherit property or when neighbors
are locked into a riparian regime for stream use. By contrast, voluntary
forms include any time people choose to enter into a property institution
such as a marriage or condominium. Cooperation-enhancing limitations on
exit become increasingly problematic when entry is involuntary, because
they infringe more severely upon individual freedom of choice. As we shift
along the spectrum toward voluntary entry, more intrusive cooperation187. Cf Green, supra note 68, at 178-79 (discussing "principles of justice in dissolution,
conditioned by the legitimate expectations of the members"). Attempts to deprive others unjustly can
be initiated either by the majority or by the minority (or one individual commoner). In the former
case, preventing unjust deprivation not only serves as an anti-opportunistic device, but also is crucial
to securing practical (and not merely theoretical) exit. See id. In the latter case, preventing unjust
deprivation safeguards against independent exploiters who' want to take the money and run.

598

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 110: 549

enhancing limitations on exit may nevertheless be consistent with liberal
values.
Similarly, liberal commons settings include forms in which the
"intensity" of membership ranges along a spectrum from limited to
comprehensive. Thus, there are some forms-such as close corporations
and condominium associations-where the common interest is relatively
limited, so that the commoners preserve many other areas of individual
control. Other forms are more comprehensive or inclusive-think of
marriage-so that the sharing covers significant aspects of the commoners'
lives. Cooperation-enhancing limitations on exit become increasingly
problematic when membership is inclusive (as it is with the involuntary
forms mentioned above) because they infringe more severely upon
individual freedom of choice. As we shift along the spectrum back toward
limited intensity, more intrusive cooperation-enhancing limitations on exit
may nevertheless be consistent with liberal values.
c. Alienation vs. Dissolution

When is dissolution even necessary to preserve liberal exit? That is,
when is a right of alienation not enough? Another way of posing the
problem is to ask when a departing individual should be able to break up a
liberal commons. For some property forms, such as the condominium
association or perhaps the cooperative, sale may be a sufficient protection
for liberal exit, and the repertoire of alienation restraints we discuss below
is enough to protect cooperation values. In these cases, particularly where
cooperation is based more on voluntary entry and its intensity is limited, a
liberal commons does not require allowing the possibility of dissolution that
has both community-destruction and private-benefit-destruction effects."' 8
Often, however, sale does not sufficiently protect exit, because it can be
expected to undervalue the pro rata ownership share of the exiter. This
undervaluation is increasingly likely and significant in settings where the
noneconomic benefits of cooperation and the gains from participation are
more central to use of the commons resource. 189
d.

Three Mechanisms

Regarding both alienation and dissolution, a range of mechanisms may
promote cooperation-enhancing exit, for example, cooling-off periods, exit
188. The private-benefit-destruction effect may arise in cases where one (or some) of the
commoners developed private benefits related to her share in the commons (benefits that are not
shared by everyone or not shared equally).
189. A typical example for this category is co-ownership of a family farm, discussed below in
Part IV. Even in these cases, however, we believe that a majority that seeks to resist the breakup
of the community should be able to buy out the party seeking exit, so long as that party is fully
compensated for the value of her share. See infra text accompanying note 197.
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taxes, and rights of first refusal. However, our endorsement of these
mechanisms is not unlimited. To remain consistent with a liberal framework,
we must fine-tune these mechanisms so that they continue to protect a
certain class of exit decisions, those that are informed and sincere. 9 °
i.

Cooling-OffPeriods

An unlimited right to exit can threaten cooperation and efficiency by
generating a domino effect, a problem especially severe because of the
asymmetrical information inherent in the decision to exit. Insights from
cognitive psychology help refine this seemingly unequivocal conclusion. In
game-theoretic terms, they teach us that when people repeat interactions,
they typically come to view their relationship as if it were of endless or
unknown duration, a conception that can lead them to switch to voluntary
cooperation. Even when the horizon is definite, cooperation may be
possible so long as the horizon is distant enough. The domino effect, with
defection as a dominant strategy, operates only for certain short-timehorizon games.191

This cognitive psychology finding suggests that law can provide a
useful role in facilitating cooperation and efficiency by allowing temporary
restraints on exit. Limited restraints on alienation and on rights to call for
dissolution can help create a brief "grace period" that may extend the
horizon of exit enough to catalyze mutual long-term cooperation. This
marginal compromise on exit, allowing parties to lock themselves in a
commons for a time, may help lead them to adopt a strategy of tit-for-tat
which fully "rational" parties would adopt only in indefinite games. And
once cooperation begins, it will arguably yield social and efficiency gains
that would, as we have seen, support the parties' continued trust and
cooperation. Hence, tweaking exit may turn the tide against the pessimistic
scenario of the tragedy of the commons and build momentum toward the
types of successful cooperation that can carry the day.' 92
190. Note that this approach, which disfavors opportunistic exit, requires a measure of
instrumental reasoning. However, the instrumental analysis is deployed here to refine the class of
exit decisions protected from a liberal standpoint, not as an end in itself.
191. See MARTIN J. OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, A COURSE IN GAME THEORY 135 (1994).

As an aside, recall that in all these cases, the norms of well-socialized commoners can override lawcreated incentives.
192. Cf. Scott & Scott, supra note 123, at 1283 (arguing that a cooling-off period "reduces
the risk of asymmetric investment" by reducing the risk of strategic exit or threats of exit and
encourages the parties to invest in the relationship even where the expected reciprocity is longterm). Some may object to our reliance on people's irrationality as a means for driving the right
outcome, suggesting that our solution offends transparency, which is another important liberal
value, and--even more importantly-is disrespectful of people. But both of these objections must
be wrong. People's cognitive biases do not necessarily disappear if they are exposed, and thus
there is no need to conceal the law's reliance on these failures. Further, there is no reason to think
of such deviations from the rational-actor model in derogatory terms. Some of the most rewarding
goods in life cannot and should not be reduced to market rationality. See generally ANDERSON,
supra note 123, at 141-67 (discussing the ethical limitations of market rationality).
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In most, if not all, cases, a cooling-off period corresponds to, rather
than undermines, our liberal commitments, because it helps ensure that a
decision to exit is informed and sincere. A cooling-off period gives more
time for the benefits of cooperation to be perceived and allows transitory
emotions to cool. Even if at the end exit still occurs, the cooling-off period
allows a departing exploiter-namely, an insincere exiter-to be caught
more readily and compelled to disgorge unjust profits.
ii. Exit Taxes
If prohibitive, exit taxes are incompatible with our liberal
commitments, in part because they can thwart the desires of commoners
who want to flee majority exploitation. But if reasonable, exit taxes can
serve as an important cooperation-enhancing device, as well as ensure that
the exiter's decision is informed and sincere. The dividing line between the
prohibitive and the reasonable is imprecise, but by no means arbitrary. Exit
taxes are reasonable and thus legitimate if they serve either a protective
function or a deterrence function, but only up to a point.
As a protective device, exit taxes ensure that people will not decide to
exit too casually, and help protect innocent commoners from the potential
harm caused by one member's exit. In this role, exit taxes should monetize
the destructive effects of exit, targeting, in the alienation example, the costs
of recruitment and socialization of a replacement commoner who can
effectively replace the exiter (including the associated monitoring costs),
and, in the dissolution case, ameliorating the costs of community breakup.
As a deterrence device, exit taxes should set a limit on incentives to
defect, thus deterring opportunistic departure. 93 In this context, an arguably
appropriate measure (balancing administrative costs against potential
underdeterrence) is the present value of the benefits to the exiter that the
commoners conferred assuming that the exiter would remain in a long-term
relationship with the other commoners.' 94 Restitution of such noncash

benefits does not violate liberal commitments to free choice if, but only if,
these benefits were willingly accepted by the member, or can be easily
reduced into wealth. 195
193. One concern with exit taxes is that, by increasing the incentive needed before exit
becomes rational, they may induce opportunists to exploit even more to justify their costs on exit.
If so, then exit taxes would not ameliorate, but rather exacerbate exploitation. But by pushing
potential exploiters to be so greedy, exit taxes can also significantly increase the likelihood of
detection. This effect is likely to (at least) counterbalance the concern of exacerbating
exploitation.
194. See generally Hanoch Dagan, Encroachments: Between Private and Public, in THE
COMPARATIVE LAW OF UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT (David Johnston & Reinhard Zimmermann eds.,
forthcoming 2001) (arguing that restitution of benefits is the appropriate measure for deterring
infringements).
195. Dagan & White, supra note 141, at 387-89. But see Rosen, supra note 78, at 1101. Rosen's
only stipulation on this matter is that "[r]ules requiring disgorgement of particular economic benefits
allocated to the community member on the assumption that he or she would be a lifetime member
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A problem may arise even if exit taxes are appropriately set to address
either the protective or the deterrence functions. A correctly set exit tax
may nevertheless be so high that it has the effect of practically locking
members into their current communities. In such a case, there is an
unavoidable choice between the commitment to enhance cooperation and
the liberal value of preserving exit. We would lean toward a more cautious
attitude, by which we mean one that requires both justification under 1the
96
protective or deterrence rationales and assurance that members can leave.
iii. Rights of FirstRefusal

Rights of first refusal may represent another modest limitation on exit
aimed at facilitating cooperation.' 97 For alienation, such rights target the

commoners'

often reasonable

concern regarding the possibility of

98

undesirable entrants:' Rights of first refusal allow the group some degree
of control over the identity of future transferees of the current commoners.

More importantly, these rights provide a mechanism for preventing the
entry of noncooperative parties as well as for preventing exploitation by
exiters who may be motivated either by spite or by the possibility of side
payments from remaining members to ensure cooperative replacements.
Regarding dissolution, rights of first refusal may be an effective means
of preserving community where a subset of members resist breaking up the
community and are willing to buy out the party seeking exit. To preserve

exit given such a buy-out right, the price should be set according to the fair
market value of the exiter' s share (minus the exit taxes, if they apply) if the
commons resource were dissolved.'99 Only when the majority is not willing

or able to exercise its buy-out option should dissolution be necessary.

should be presumptively valid to the extent such provisions do not make exit an impossibility." Il
Our approach above is more careful about autonomy.
196. Ideally, exit taxes should be calibrated in utility terms, which requires that they take into
account wealth disparities. In some settings this fine-tuning may prove, however, to be too
cumbersome from an administrative standpoint.
197. The conventional wisdom has long been that these rights have, at most, a minimal effect
on property value because they do not impede alienation. E.g., 3 ERIC MILLS HOLMES, CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS § 11.3, at 484-85 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1996). Recent work, though,
suggests that, because of the high search and negotiation costs of bidding on unique property
subject to first refusal rights, alienation (and hence owner exit) may be significantly burdened.
David I. Walker, Rethinking Rights of First Refusal, 5 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 1, 16-18, 43-46
(1999); see also Marcel Kahan, An Economic Analysis of Rights of First Refusal (June 1999)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal) (modeling the value of rights of first
refusal and rights of first offer).
198. See McKean, supra note 6, at 263 (noting that successful commons regimes tend to have
careful eligibility screening for individual households).
199. As an aside, rights of first refusal may raise issues of discrimination when existing
insiders restrict entry, but these issues are better policed through familiar antidiscrimination
mechanisms. On this point, see sources cited supra note 94.
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The three spheres of a liberal commons work together, as Table 1
summarizes. The sphere of individual dominion provides anti-opportunism
mechanisms that can yield economic and social gains over private property.
The sphere of democratic self-governance can make voice effective by
facilitating trust and participation, thus allowing dynamic, satisfying, and
prosperous management of the commons resource. Finally, well-calibrated
cooperation-enhancing exit can build momentum for continuity in a
commons while preserving individual autonomy. This synthesis holds, at
least in theory. The next Part examines whether the liberal commons
template helps one understand a case study in law and practice.
TABLE 1. A THEORY OF THE LIBERAL COMMONS

1. Preserve the
Liberal Value of
Exit
2. Achieve Gains
from Cooperation

Recognize the link between exit and autonomy

3. Use Law To
Catalyze Trust

Recognize the limits of direct legal control

Accept reasonable limits on entry
Maximize economic gains from resource use
Strengthen social and interpersonal values

Deploy law as a safety net to strengthen social norms

1. The Sphere of
DIniua

Deter opportunistic overuse and underinvestment
Help create fruits and revenues and divide them fairly

2. The Sphere of

Use default rules to promote well-tempered voice

Democratic
Self-overance
3. The Sphere of
Cooperation-

Enable broad majority rule, yet protect the minority
Create opterrent and protective exit mechanisms

L Enhancing Exit

Protect exit decisions that are informed and sincere

IV. TRAGIC CHOICE IN AMERICAN CO-OWNERSHIP

Modem property law is a story of introducing and refining new liberal
commons types, from versions of the close corporation, to common-interest
communities, all the way to versions of marital property law, with each
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variant spelling out default settings for the three spheres of action, and then
encouraging experimentation and custom-tailoring. Even old-fashioned law
has pockets of highly articulated solutions to the problems of shared
ownership, usually regimes addressed to particular natural resources, such
as riparian law regarding running water, or unitization rules for oil fields.2"
While our future work20 1 will show how the liberal commons helps make
sense of numerous legal institutions-and in turn how understanding these
institutions refines the liberal commons framework-here we explore a
fraught story drawn from old-fashioned default rules, rules that have proven
poorly tailored to liberal commons goals.
The default American law of co-ownership invites tragedy: It
undermines cooperation even when co-owners seek to work together,
encourages distrust and misuse that may delay or even prevent use of
emerging resources, and, more generally, imposes enduring losses
whenever strategic behaviors or transaction costs deter people from
voluntarily adopting a more tailored liberal commons form. American law
currently forces people to choose between laboriously contracting for their
own liberal commons or suffering under existing background rules that
encourage conflict, mismanagement, and division. Property law can do
better.
The decline in black rural landownership detailed in the first Section of
this Part forms the backdrop for our co-ownership case study. The decline
in black landownership that has frequently been understood as an inevitable
result of the workings of ownership and management of commons
resources may instead be, in some part, the contingent result of discrete
legal choices. The second Section shows that the American law of coownership incorporates choices in each sphere of action that disfavor
effective commons ownership. For each choice that American law makes,
we counterpose choices made by other developed legal systems that are
more supportive of liberal commons goals. Seen from this global
perspective, the American system is an outlier on a spectrum. To the extent
law matters in shaping behavior, the comparative approach suggests some
room for useful legal reform.
A. The Disappearanceof Black RuralLandowners
1. An Initial Caveat to This FraughtExample

As an initial caveat, we should note that this Section does not make any
of several possible claims regarding declining black farmland ownership.

200. See, e.g., JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF

PROPERTY 407 (3d ed. 1989).
201. The next two articles planned in this series will be authored by Carolyn Frantz and
Hanoch Dagan, see supra note 64, and Michael Heller and Rick Hills, see supranote 65.
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First, we do not claim, or believe, that the law of co-ownership accounts, in
a strong sense, for declining black ownership rates. Rather, we suspect that
in a regression analysis, farm size would statistically explain most of the
decline: Similar-sized white-owned farms and solely-owned black farms
have also largely disappeared. Second, and relatedly, we do not claim that
comprehensive reform of co-ownership law, if made in previous
generations, would have operated directly to preserve black farms. The
effects of poverty and race discrimination have been such that black
farmers would likely have been done out of their land (by loan sharks and
other scam artists) even if the law of co-ownership had been more
favorable. Third, we do not claim that any individual legal change would
make a difference for potential black farmers. Given our view of how law
operates to affect behavior, farmers would be unlikely to act on, or even be
aware of, any discrete law reform. Finally, we do not claim that remaining
on uneconomic farms would necessarily have been a good outcome. For
many black families, the best use of heir ownership shares often was
precisely to finance education and escape from a hostile and hopeless social
milieu.
Instead, we raise the black land case in a more tentative spirit, meant to
illustrate how the liberal commons approach helps frame new questions,
provoke research, and suggest attractive reforms. The material provides a
backdrop for, and gives some texture to the evaluation of, the law reforms
we discuss in the following Section. Had the law been supportive of
cooperation in the spirit of the liberal commons, its behavioral and
expressive effects might have helped to change the outcome for at least
some black farm families, those who wanted to maintain their farms but
were driven off in part by the unintended consequences of bad law.2"2 While
no individual law reform would seem likely to have mattered much in this
example, collectively, the package of reforms we propose might have made
some difference, and may yet matter for emerging resources with the same
analytic structure that are subject to a similar legal regime.
2. The Rise and Fall of Heir Property
Consider a common tale of commons property: In 1887, John Brown, a
black man, bought eighty acres of land in Rankin County, Mississippi; in
1935, he died intestate, leaving his wife and children as heirs who in turn
also died intestate, leaving the land to their children and grandchildren." 3
202. For another exploration of the interaction of race and political/legal structure, see
Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 92. While race discrimination was undeniably an integral aspect
of blacks' exclusion from southern primaries, Issacharoff and Pildes show that this argument
misses the structural reasons for all-white primaries. Id. at 662-64.
203. See EMERGENCY LAND FUND, THE IMPACT OF HEIR PROPERTY ON BLACK RURAL LAND
TENURE IN THE SOUTHEASTERN REGION OF THE UNITED STATES 283-86 (1980) [hereinafter HEIR

PROPERTY]. See generally Thomas W. Mitchell, From Reconstruction to Deconstruction:
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One of these grandchildren, Willie Brown, began consolidating ownership
in the land by buying the interests of five of John's nine children: Frances,
Minnie, Adda, Joe, and Lizzie. By the time Willie died, he had accumulated
an undivided 41/72d interest, which he left to his wife Ruth. In 1978, Ruth
filed for partition in kind of the farm, asking that her interest be physically
separated from the remainder held by sixty-six other Brown heirs, whose
interests ranged from 1/18th down to 1/19,440th of the farm. 4 The court,
however, ordered the land partitioned by sale with the proceeds divided
among the heirs."' At the sale, a white-owned lumber company outbid
Ruth.20 Ruth got some cash-more than she was willing or able to pay, but
perhaps less than she would have demanded to compensate her for the
farm's subjective value in preserving her family's cohesion and traditions.
Just after the Civil War, when John Brown bought his eighty acres, black
landownership in America began a steep rise. Nearly a century later, Ruth
Brown lost her family land, and black landownership had nearly
disappeared.
The uprooting of landed heirs is an oft-repeated tale in black America,
particularly in the rural South. 20 7 From 1920 to 1978, the number of blackoperated farms in the United States dropped 94%, from almost one million
to just over 57,000; by comparison, white-operated farms dropped 56%,
from about 5.4 million to 2.4 million. 08 In absolute terms, there are fewer
than 19,000 black farmers in America today-less than 1% of American
farmers-and black Americans continue to abandon farms at a rate three
times that of white Americans.0 9 Why? Leave aside racial discrimination
and wealth effects for the moment, factors that matter in this story and to
which we return." 0 Some scholarly explanations for the precipitous decline
of black landownership have focused on the role of partition sales, which
Undermining Black Landownership, Political Independence and Community Through Partition Sales
of Tenancies in Common (1999) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, University of Wisconsin) (on file with
The Yale Law Journal) (discussing the role of partition sales in declining black farmland ownership
and collecting sources).
204. HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 203, at 284-86 (listing the heirs' interests and reproducing the
Brown family tree).
205. Id. at 283.
206. Id.
207. See BLACK FARMING, supra note 1, at 45. In 1982, 85% of all black farmers were
concentrated in the South, but they were rare even there, totaling only about 6% of Southern farmers.
Id.
208. Id. at 2-3. Between 1959 and 1969, the number of black commercial farm operators
declined by 84%, compared to 26% for white operators. Id. at 40. Between 1970 and 1980, the black
farm population dropped 65%, compared to 22% for the white population. Id.at 44. For state-bystate data on declining black landownership, see OFFICE OF MINORITY BUS. ENTER., U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, LAND AND MINORITY ENTERPRISE: THE CRISIS AND THE OPPORTUNITY (1976). For a

county-by-county breakdown of black landownership inthe South, see BROWNE, supra note 3, at
apps. Q-W.
209. Settlement, supra note 1;see also BLACK FARMING, supra note 1,at 44 (indicating that, of
America's six million farm residents in 1982, 4% were black Americans).
210. Settlement, supra note I (discussing decades of routine discrimination by the Department
of Agriculture in denying crucial loans to black farmers); see also infra text accompanying notes
225-226.
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are the background legal mechanism governing disposition of co-owned
land in the Brown family saga.2" ' Over a quarter of remaining black-owned
land in the Southeast is now "heir property" averaging eight co-owners,
five of whom live outside the Southeast. 12 By 1986, "more Mississippi
21 3
land [was] owned by blacks in Chicago than by blacks in Mississippi."
As one study concludes, partition laws "are14 unquestionably the judicial
method by which most heir property is lost." 2
Heir property is just co-owned property arguably rendered
ungovernable because of repeated rounds of intestate succession-a
particular issue for Southern rural black landowners with "superstitions
about making wills," 215 but no desire to have their family farmland broken
up or sold. In general, when a landowner dies intestate (that is, without a
will), the heirs at law receive fractional undivided interests in the land. For
example, each of John Brown's nine children received a 1/9th undivided
interest in the eighty acres. Often, this first generation of heirs successfully
manages their parents' property, but second and third generations multiply
quickly and prove less and less able collectively to cope.216
Over time, practical problems become unresolvable. Under the
American law of co-ownership, unless fractional owners unanimously
consent, the underlying land cannot be managed in any useful way; nor can
it be mortgaged; nor can any discrete fraction of the land be sold. Without
effective democratic self-governance mechanisms for co-owned property,
" [h]eir property is rarely improved or developed, due to the threat of
partition sales and the difficulty of obtaining credit on partial interests in the
property. 'In fact, a third more heir than non-heir property is not being used
at all.' 217' Thus, " [t]he sale of the land, usually precipitated by an heir who
is more than one generation removed from the originating source, becomes
inevitable." '2
3.

Community-Destroying Exit

What are the paths that lead to the end of black landownership? First, as
with the Brown example, resident heirs may bring suit to quiet title
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 203,
HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 203,
Ward Sinclair, Black Farmers:A
HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 203,
Joseph Brooks, The Emergency

at 282; see, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 203, at 4-7.
at 62.
Dying Minority, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1986, at A1.
at 282.
Land Fund: A Rural Land Retention and Development

Model, in THE BLACK RURAL LANDOWNER-ENDANGERED SPECIES 117, 121 (Leo McGee &

Robert Boone eds., 1979).
216. HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 203, at 282-83. See generally BROWNE, supra note 3, at 54
(describing the obstacles to effective governance created by the multiplying number of owners as
land passes through several generations). Governance difficulties are compounded because
identifying heirs with legal interests becomes a more complex and expensive project with each
passing generation. Id.
217. BLACK FARMING, supra note 1, at 68 (quoting HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 203, at 75).
218. HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 203, at 282-83.
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intending to acquire ownership in severalty of part of the farm.21 9 By
seeking a partition in kind, these heirs express their preference to stay on
the land and to gain access to mortgages and other ordinary incidents of
sole private ownership.22 Despite the heirs' request, and the law's nominal
preference for partition in kind, courts usually order a partition sale because
the number of heirs and limited size of the property make physical division
impracticable.22' The second, more sinister, path to partition sales originates

with nonresident heirs. A non-family-member may acquire a distant
nonresident heir's fractional share in a family farm specifically for the
purpose of forcing a partition sale at which the outsider can buy the whole
tract.222 Because heir property is very common among rural blacks, "the
black community is particularly vulnerable to the unscrupulous partition
sale brought about by someone buying out the interest of a single heir and
22 3
then demanding that the land be sold."

Partition sales, like foreclosure and tax sales, prove to be poor, often
rigged markets with little information and few buyers: "[T]he purchaser[s]
at these [partition and] tax sales are almost always white persons, frequently
local lawyers or relatives of the local officials, who make it their business to
keep abreast of what properties are going to auction and who attend the

auctions prepared to buy." 224 Given wealth disparities, widespread
discrimination in access to credit for rural black households, and the
ordinary imperfections of these rural auctions, partition sales in practice
mean the transfer of the land from resident black heirs with fractional
interests to white purchasers who often pay below market value and pay
nothing for the farm's intangible value in preserving family cohesion.225
Farming, from all reports, is a chancy business. If cashing out simply
improves blacks' overall position and consolidates economically obsolete

219. See BROWNE, supra note 3, at 54.
220. As an aside, filing suit often turns out to be a significant strategic error based on the
mistaken belief held by most southern rural black landowners (according to surveys) that "an heir's
interest cannot be sold without the consent of all the heirs, and that heirs in possession of the land
have superior rights to the land." BLACK FARMING, supra note 1, at 69 (reporting a survey of black
landowners).
221. Even when partition in kind is possible and perhaps even practical, courts favor partition
sales. See RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 1 612 (Richard R. Powell & Patrick J.
Rohan eds., abr. ed. 1968).
222. See BROWNE, supra note 3, at 55.
223. Brooks, supra note 215, at 121.
224. See BROWNE, supra note 3, at 53. Indeed, these bidders may well be the people who
induced the action for partition. Id. at 55 ("A variation of this procedure, where the white man
instigates the partition after having gained a small interest, has been used, especially in the past, to
gain black-owned land.").
225. Criticizing the prevalence of forced partition sales, one note argues that judges have
"misapplied the statutes and allowed private interests to use the statutory process as a land
acquisition tool at the expense of cotenant landowners." John G. Casagrande, Jr., Note, Acquiring
Property Through Forced PartitioningSales: Abuses and Remedies, 27 B.C. L. REv. 755, 772
(1986).
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farms,226 then the decline in black landownership may not be a serious

problem, notwithstanding the congressional studies227 and private
initiatives... concerned with halting this trend. However, declining black
landownership also can be traced in part, perhaps, to the difficulty of
governing fractionated land, resulting in partition sales initiated either by
resident heirs seeking to improve land management or by nonresident heirs
and their purchasers seeking to acquire the whole farm at bargain prices.22 9
The hostility of American law toward co-ownership appears to impose
several costs, not only on individual black families, but perhaps on farm
communities more broadly.23

Landownership provides benefits other than just farm income.
Commoners may prefer not to sell because they identify alternative
economic uses or they place a high subjective value on keeping the land in
the family. For example, one study of a rural North Carolina community
showed how landownership provides reciprocal benefits within black
families: Older owners can obligate children by allowing them to settle on
the land, and the children then provide support for the elderly landowner in
this residential enclave.23 1 By contrast, the study notes, landless elderly
people are less likely to be able to mobilize informal support and more
likely to suffer lower living standards. 3 Along with simple economic
reasons, there may also be cognitive framing issues for sales: A farm might
stay in the family because the family would not be "willing to accept" the
market price, but if forced to bid at auction, that same family might only be
226. In 1982, the average commercial black-owned farm in the South was 128 acres, while
the average white-owned farm was 428 acres. BLACK FARMING, supra note 1, at 50. "Economies
of scale, research and technology, tax benefits, government price and income supports, and
commercial lending all militate against the survival of black-operated small farms." Id. (footnote
omitted).
227. E.g., Housing and Community Development Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-557, 92 Stat.
2080 (1978); BLACK FARMING, supra note 1.
228. The most significant private initiative is the Emergency Land Fund, a private, nonprofit
organization founded in 1971 to counter black land loss. See Brooks, supra note 215, at 117.
229. There are incentives outside of property law that also encourage partition. For example,
attorney fee structures often award lawyers 10% of the land value on partition sale, but not if the
title problem is informally resolved. There are many stories of lawyers who have initiated
partition suits for heirs over the objection of the heirs' families. In one case, a New York heir
asked her lawyer to provide deeds to the family property, but the lawyer instead filed an action for
sale and partition. When the heir fired the lawyer, the lawyer then found another heir to prosecute
the suit. HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 203, at 292-93. Also, the tax system encourages partition
sales by favoring wealthy investors who can write off certain losses in ways not available to lowor moderate-income farmers. See BLACK FARMING, supra note 1, at 4.
230. See, e.g., William E. Nelson, Jr., Black Rural Land Decline and PoliticalPower, in THE
BLACK RURAL LANDOWNER-ENDANGERED SPECIES, supra note 215, at 83, 93 ("The absence of a
viable equity base has been costly to the black community both economically and politically. Black
dependency on white economic support has served to rob the black community of its autonomous
decision-making potential.").
231. Lisa Groger, Tied to Each Other Through Ties to the Land: Informal Support of Black
Elders in a Southern U.S. Community, 7 J. CROSS-CULTURAL GERONTOLOGY 205,205,210 (1992).
232. Id. at 205, 217; cf Lisa A. Kelly, Race and Place: Geographic and Transcendent
Community in the Post-Shaw Era, 49 VAND. L. REv. 227, 243 n.56 (1996) (discussing varying
levels of ability of landless elders to mobilize informal support).
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"willing to pay" a lower amount and would thus lose the farm. 33 Finally,
when commoners do decide to sell nonviable farms, they get only distressed
prices for individual share sales or at partition auctions. They could do
better by marketing the property cooperatively, but if the law facilitated
cooperation, then they might not want to sell in the first instance."3
We cannot know how much of the sharp decline of black
landownership should be attributed to race and class discrimination, or to
market forces that make small farms not economically viable. Encouraging
and enabling black farmers to write wills and improving the integrity of
partition auctions may have ameliorated the decline to an extent. It seems
plausible, however, that, at least on the margin, some of this decline might
have resulted from a particular default legal regime that does not support
commons ownership and instead actively undermines any possibility for its
success, even when the family deeply desires to continue working together,
to keep land in the family, and to give family members a fair share when
they leave.
B. How Law Can Dissolve Tragic Choice
The American law of co-ownership shrinks from any attempt to
facilitate management of co-owned resources. Instead, by providing
incentives for mismanagement, the default rules of the common law make
the continuing existence of a commons a risky enterprise for commoners
(technically, usually cotenants). 3 Over time and in many ways, the
American law of co-ownership dilutes the value of interests in commons
ownership, making them less and less usable for the commoners.
Combined, the rules promote underuse, overuse, and underinvestmentanything but the actions of an ordinary sole owner managing his or her own

233. This phenomenon of cognitive psychology was hypothesized by Mark Kelman,
Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L.
REv. 669 (1979). Later studies confirmed the effect. Loss aversion may at least partially explain
this difference. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of
Decisions,59 J. BUS. S251, S258 (1986).
234. Perhaps locking people together by preventing alienation, the no-exit illiberal solution,
would have kept more farms within the family. But such a solution, even if it achieved
community-preserving goals, would still be tragic, because it sacrifices each heir's liberty to exit.
Further, we question whether preventing alienability would necessarily achieve even instrumental
community-building goals. Consider the disastrous consequences of the federal allotment policy
for Native Americans that locked people together without providing effective internal selfgovernance mechanisms. See Heller, supra note 56, at 1213-17 (discussing the tragedy of the
anticommons resulting from these policies).
235. Cotenants are those who share land under the common-law regime of tenancy in
common. Each individual tenant has an interest in the same undivided piece of property. Unlike
joint tenants, cotenants have no right of survivorship. See DUKEMINiER & KRIER, supra note 11,
at 322. In all states where it existed, the presumption in favor of joint tenancy has been abolished
almost completely, id. at 323, so, on death and in the absence of a will, heirs hold property as
tenants in common. Abolishing the presumption of joint tenancy thus may have had the
unintended effect of accelerating fractionation.
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property. Given the penalty default legal regime of the common law, the
tragedy of the commons turns out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy.
By contrast, Continental legal regimes do a better job of supporting the
goals of a liberal commons, although some fall short in significant ways.
Legal regimes that descend more from the French side of the tradition
(France and Belgium) diverge in a few places from those on the German
236
side (Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and in this context, Israel ). One of
these divergences-the requirement of unanimity in democratic selfgovernance-makes the French tradition significantly less supportive of the
liberal commons than its Germanic counterpart. But viewed broadly,
Continental legal systems possess most of the features we identified as
supporting the liberal commons: facilitating the flourishing of the common
use of property while still allowing meaningful exit. Even those Continental
legal systems of the French tradition that carry the uncomfortable baggage
of unanimity (creating the conditions for anticommons tragedy) are still
considerably more supportive of liberal commons values than the American
law. Recently, England, America's common-law parent, passed a law
237
reform that significantly aligns its law with liberal commons goals.
The differences between the American and Continental laws of coownership are quite tedious. But, over time, it is the collective impact of
just those tedious details that helps shape the norms of communities of coowners, and tilts co-owners' attempts to cooperate toward success or
failure. Whether something more like the Continental law would have made
a difference for the black landowner is difficult to gauge in retrospect, as
we mentioned earlier. Perhaps it would not have. And no single change
would likely have made any difference. The decline may have been
overdetermined, with racism in lending and changes in technology dwarfing
subtle changes in the formal law. There is no way now to tease out the
causal links between formal law and the informal norms and practices
among black farm families and surrounding communities.
Nevertheless, the possibility that European farm families can now stay
more easily on their land when family members depart suggests at least a

236. In many respects, Israel is usually considered a common-law jurisdiction. But the Israeli
Land Law is part of a codification that was heavily influenced by the Continental tradition. See
Yoram Shachar, History and Sources of Israeli Law, in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ISRAEL 1,
5-6 (Amos Shapira & Karen C. DeWitt-Arar eds., 1995).
237. The reason for the traditional common-law hostility towards co-ownership is somewhat
of a puzzle, especially if we are correct in our claim that co-ownership is not an institution that
necessarily fails. One possibility is that an outdated hostility toward feudal forms drove the
development of co-ownership law. Consider W.W. BUCKLAND & ARNOLD D. MCNAIR, ROMAN
LAW & COMMON LAW: A COMPARISON IN OUTLINE 106 (2d ed. 1952), which states:
The inconvenience of common ownership was so great that a power of division was from
early times inherent in the institution.... The contrary rule of our earlier law, till Henry
VIII, under which no partition could be compelled (except as between coparceners, who
became joint owners by operation of law, so that the position was not voluntarily
assumed), rests, no doubt, in reality more on the interest of the chief lord in having the
services undivided than on this ground ....
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testable proposition. 13 Perhaps the formal law matters occasionally even in
rural farm communities and operates as the liberal commons theory
predicts. Whether German farm families respond to supportive coownership law (or whether regression modeling would point wholly to
government price supports 23 9) then becomes an interesting question for

fieldwork and empirical testing. For emerging and "new economy"
resources today, perhaps a default co-ownership law supportive of liberal
commons goals could be even more important in catalyzing a virtuous
circle of trust and cooperation.
1. The Sphere of Individual Dominion
a. American Law

The common law facilitates a race to overuse-the classic image of a
tragedy of the commons. Each commoner is entitled to full possession and,
more importantly, in most states, the commoner can possess and use the
commons without paying any rental value to the nonpossessors24 (so long
as the nonpossessors are not excluded or ousted from possession 24 ). These
rules provide an incentive for overuse because each commoner must make
242
affirmative uses, or else receive no rents from the resource.
In the farm context, the common-law incentives for underinvestment
are probably much more salient. As an initial matter, the law is relatively
receptive to claims for accounting or contribution for payments of taxes,
238. In some circumstances, family farms can be a rather efficient scale of agricultural
production. See generally HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 141-42 (1996)
(contrasting the success of family farms with the failure of vertically organized agricultural
cooperatives).
239. See, e.g., Alison Maitland, Shrewd Farmers See the Way the Wind Is Blowing, FIN. TIMES,
Mar. 17, 1998, at 2 (discussing German farmers' support for extensive price subsidies).
240. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.14, at 57 (A. James Casner ed., 1952); DUKEMINIER
& KRtER, supra note 11, at 351; W.W. Allen, Annotation, Accountability of CotenantsforRents and
Profitsor Use and Occupation,51 A.L.R.2d 388, 395 (1957). There are, however, jurisdictions that
have adopted other rules. For example, some jurisdictions have statutes or common law that
specifically require tenants in possession to compensate nonpossessory commoners for the value of
possession, usually calculated as the nonpossessing tenant's proportionate share of rent, as if the
property were rented to a third party. ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 5.8, at 214 & n.22 (2d ed. 1993); Evelyn Alicia Lewis, Struggling with Quicksand: The Ins and
Outs of Cotenant Possession Value Liability and a Callfor Default Rule Reform, 1994 Wis. L. REV.
331, 351. Other jurisdictions hold the duty to account applicable whenever a "cotenant derives any
income from the sole possession of the property in the form of rents or otherwise." CUNNINGHAM ET
AL., supra, § 5.8, at 213-14.
241. See CUNNINGHAM ETAL., supra note 240, § 5.8, at 211-12.
242. In theory, but not in practice, the law of waste might penalize a cotenant for overuse, such
as clear-cutting timber from property today if the timber would be more valuable in later years.
While the law of waste is designed to avoid property use that fails to maximize the property's value,
see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 73 (4th ed. 1992), the law is sufficiently
confused and the penalties sufficiently light that overuse is encouraged, CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra
note 240, § 5.8, at 214-15. Courts are divided over the question of whether cutting timber or drilling
for oil constitutes waste (activities that the law may well want to encourage on the appropriate scale).
2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 240, § 6.15, at 65-66.
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mortgages, and other necessary charges made by one commoner on behalf
of the others."43 But if one commoner makes necessary repairs without the
others' consent, most courts are much less forthcoming, allowing the
investing conunoner to receive contribution only at partition, or through a
setoff in the (rare) case where a court requires an investing commoner to
account for rents and profits.2" This rule has been rationalized as necessary
because questions "of how much should be expended on repairs, their
character and extent, and whether as a matter of business judgment such
expenditures are justified" are too uncertain for the law to settle. 24 5 Thus,
commoners who make repairs take a significant risk that they will not be
reimbursed; alternatively, they are led to partition as the only available
avenue to recoup their investment expenditures."

243. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 240, § 6.17, at 73-74; DUKEMINIER & KREER,
supra note 11, at 359. Some jurisdictions, however, have adopted a rule that if the tenant who paid
taxes is in possession and the value of his or her use and enjoyment equals or exceeds such payment,
then there is no cause of action for contribution. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 240,
§ 6.17, at 76; DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 11, at 359. This modification, however, is itself not
uniformly applied. See Allen, supra note 240, § 19.
244. On the complex, conflicting, and multifarious approaches to cotenants and repairs, consult
2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supranote 240, § 6.18, at 77-80; CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note
240, § 5.9, at 215-16; DUKEMINIER & KRtER, supra note 11, at 359; 2 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE
LAW OF RESTITUTION § 10.7, at 430 (1978); Berger, supra note 160, at 1019-20; and John P.
Dawson, The Self-Serving Intermeddler,87 HARv. L. REv. 1409, t422-24 (1974).
It may appear at first sight that the doctrine of ouster provides a background rule of strict
accounting. An action for ejectment restores possession to an ousted plaintiff and awards the
plaintiff mesne profits, with an offset for necessary repairs (and perhaps some improvements, if
profits are attributable to them). CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 240, § 5.8, at 212, 214. Ouster,
however, requires an express denial of another cotenant's right to entry and possession. The
doctrine provides no remedy for a cotenant who is in possession or who is voluntarily not in
possession. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 240, § 6.13, at 52-54; CUNNINGHAM ET
AL., supra note 240, § 5.8, at 211. Furthermore, there is a presumption that one cotenant's
possession (even if it is sole possession) is not adverse to other cotenants' possession. 7 POWELL,
612, § 50.03(2); Allen, supra note 240, § 13, at 437. Thus, ouster doctrine
supra note 221,
provides some recourse only in a limited set of circumstances and may be costly or difficult to
prove even then.
245. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 240, § 6.18, at 78.
246. To complete the picture, we should mention the common-law rules regarding
improvements. Cotenants who make improvements on the property are generally unable to bring
an action for contribution, nor are they credited the cost of the improvement in an accounting for
rents and profits. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 240, § 6.18, at 81; Dawson, supra
note 244, at 1424. The only recourse available for tenants to recover their investment is partition.
Dawson, supra note 244, at 1425; see also DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 11, at 360
(discussing improvements). Nevertheless, even with partition, the valuation of improvements
discourages such expenditures. The majority rule is that improving cotenants are entitled to the
lesser of the cost of the improvement or the additional increase in property value. See 2 PALMER,
supra note 244, § 10.7, at 429-30. Contra 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 240,
§ 6.18, at 83-84 (stating that improvers are entitled to the increase in value but that the cost of
improvements is irrelevant). Some courts even say that credits for improvements can only offset
additional moneys owed and cannot be a source of income. Dawson, supra note 244, at 1425-26
& n.48.
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b. Comparative Perspective

The Continental traditions have desirable rules for discouraging both
overuse and underinvestment. For example, to avoid overuse, Israel makes
the user liable to the other co-owners for the cost of use. 47 Further,
countries in the Continental traditions distribute the net fruits and revenues
of the property on the basis of the commoners' shares in the property, thus
helping both to discourage overuse and to inculcate a sense of community
among the commoners.248
Likewise, Germany and Israel require immediate reimbursement for
expenses reasonably required for maintenance and management of the
commons resource, while denying compensation for improvements (whose
value is less clearly shared by all commoners).249 This relatively broad
provision for immediate reimbursement for noncontestable (reasonable)
collective goods bestowed upon the land discourages the sort of
underinvestment that can make commons ownership inefficient.
Furthermore, such a regime of instantaneous contribution assumes that
dissolution is not a satisfying first or best solution but should be, indeed, a
solution of last resort.250
247. For Israel, see Israel Land Law § 33, 1959, 23 L.S.I. 288 (1968-1969); consider also the
Louisiana Civil Code, LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 806 (West Supp. 2000).
248. Section 35 of the Israeli Land Law provides, "Every joint owner is entitled to a share in
the proceeds of the joint property in accordance with his share in the property." In the Yotzer case,
the court declined to give this passage a narrowing interpretation that would have applied it only
to situations in which the proceeds were created through no particular owner's labor, or even to
adopt our complex intermediate approach. C.A. 274/82, Yotzer v. Yotzer, 39(1) P.D. 53, 55-56
(Isr.). For similar rules in Germany and Austria, see § 839 ALLGEMEINEs BURGERLICHES
GESETZBUCH [ABGB] (Aus.); §743 Nr. I BORGERLiCHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] (F.R.G.); GerdHinrich Langhein, [Commentary], in J. VON STUDINGERS KOMMENTAR ZUM BURGERLICHEN
GESETZBUCH 126-27 (Norbert Horn ed., 13th ed. 1996); and Karsten Schmidt, [Commentary], in
MONCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BORGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH §§ 743-47 (Peter Ulmer ed., 3d
ed. 1997). Thus, these countries use the second of the three plausible rules for sharing fruits and
revenues we discuss supra at text accompanying note 159. In a unique case, a German court
allocated 100% of the profits from advertising to one co-owner of a gable wall who had allowed
his side of the wall to be used for these purposes. Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in
Zivilsachen [BGHZ] [Supreme Court] 43, 127 (133-34). This outcome has been explained by the
fact that, although a gable wall is jointly owned, each side is intended to be used exclusively by
one owner. See Langhein, supra, at 127.
249. For Germany, see § 748 BGB, translated in THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE 122 (Ian S.
Forrester et al., trans., 1975), which states, "Each participant is bound as against the other
participants to bear the burdens of the common object and the costs of maintenance, management,
and common use in proportion to his share." See also Langhein, supra note 248, at 219 (indicating
that there is no compensation for improvements). This rule also holds in Israel. See Israel Land Law
§ 32. Interestingly, Swiss law, which generally follows the German Continental tradition, seems
more like American law in this respect, granting the co-owner only the right to "take on his own the
necessary steps which have to be taken without loss of time in order to preserve the object from
imminent or increasing damage." ScHwEizERIscHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH [ZGB] art. 647 (Switz.).
250. The Continental tradition also prohibits individuals from making use of the resource in a
manner that interferes with the reasonable use of other co-owners. See § 828 ABGB (Aus.); CODE
CIVIL [C. CcV.] art. 815-9 (Fr.); § 743 Nr. 2 BGB (F.R.G.); Israel Land Law § 31(a)(1); see also
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 802. These codes employ flexible guidelines to restrict use to what may
reasonably be expected by other commoners, typically by reference to the nature of the property
and its previous uses. Of course, state law in the United States, apart from Louisiana, and the law
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The Sphere of Democratic Self-Governance
a. American Law

As one commentator aptly notes, "cotenant conflicts are for the most
part hidden dramas." 251 Co-owned property in the American common law is
governed by a rule of unanimity: Each commoner has veto power over the
decisions of the other commoners regarding property management. A
leading text notes that "[i]f the cotenants cannot agree neither law nor
equity can settle such differences; nor can they specifically settle how the
property shall be used and enjoyed. The law's remedy in all such cases is
partition ... ,,252 For example, if differences arise among commoners about
whether to enter jointly into a transaction such as borrowing money against
the property or leasing it to outsiders, the law does not provide any
guidance or facilitation. Absent partition, the veto power each commoner
enjoys leads to a tragedy of the anticommons, with wasteful underuse and
eventual division, as suggested by the black landownership saga.
Given these doctrines, it is unsurprising that "[m]ost lending
institutions will not lend money on a partial interest in real property, even if
the exact amount of the partial interest is known." 3 Thus, a commoner
cannot get a mortgage on an individual fractional interest; and for groups,
unanimity rules prevent commoners from easily combining to get a
mortgage on the whole. Without access to financing-because of a missing
market-the sum of the parts proves less than the value of the whole and
commoners face a significant additional incentive to partition the land by
sale.

of other regimes that we generally consider less supportive ofliberal commons goals, also prohibit
such interfering use. The salient difference in this area comes in the details of how this prohibition
is implemented. Of particular importance is the rule adopted when joint use is impossible or
unreasonable. In such a situation, where similar use by both would be impossible, can one party
then use the property to the exclusion of the other? As we have shown, American law allows such
use, encouraging the parties to enter into a strategic game where each seeks to be the one allowed
to exclude the others, behavior inconsistent with the idea of productive cooperation. Forbidding
such use, on the other hand, encourages the parties to reach a cooperative and efficient solution
(such as a rental to a third party). Providing an incentive for such a solution is the supportive
approach to encouraging a liberal commons. German law provides just such a supportive
approach: Use by one owner is allowed only when it does not interfere with the use of other
owners. Langhein, supra note 248, at 135. If joint use is impossible, the disposition of the
property must be determined by the agreement of all of the commoners; if this is impossible,
a majority vote may determine the use of the property, and compensation for the benefits of
this use must be paid to the nonusing owners. § 745 BGB. Swiss law is similar in this regard.
ARTHUR MEIER-HAYOz, Das Eigentum [Property Rights], in 4 BERNER KOMMENTAR: DAS
SACHENRECHT 447-50 (1966) (discussing the Swiss provision). Israeli law is unsettled on this
matter, with Justice Ben-Porat favoring the unsupportive American approach and Justice
Netanyahu favoring the more supportive rule. C.A. 458/82, Vilner v. Golani, 42(1) P.D. 49 (Isr.).
251. Lewis, supra note 240, at 341.
252. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supranote 240, § 6.18, at 78.
253. HEm PROPERTY, supra note 203, at 306.
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ComparativePerspective

Focusing on the Germanic legal regimes, at the supportive end of the
Continental spectrum, we can see that the most important way they support
the liberal commons, by contrast with the American common law, is by
granting a wide jurisdiction for majority rule in the sphere of selfgovernance and reserving a relatively small sphere for unanimity.254
However, the threshold that German tradition sets between majority rule
and unanimity is more restrictive than the threshold our theoretical
discussion would suggest. We recommended that majority rule be available
for decisions that tend to increase the size of the pie and unanimity ought to
be required when decisions merely redistribute within a same-sized pie.
Instead, Germanic legal systems draw the distinction based on the

expectations of the parties. Majority rule is allowed when the decisions do
not change the parties' expectations for how the property will be used;
unanimity is required for decisions that depart significantly from these
expectations."
One may speculate that this rule is based on the concern about the risk
of court errors in complicated disputes as to the utility of conflicting uses.
We appreciate this concern. Nevertheless, we believe that adopting such a

conservative attitude toward the scope of majority rule may suffocate the
ability of the commons to adapt and grow with changing times.
Interestingly enough, Swiss law incorporates our approach into the

254. Not all Continental legal traditions have adopted this supportive rule: In general, those
countries that are more closely related to German law have majority rule, while the legal traditions
more closely related to France share the less desirable American requirement of unanimity. CODE
cIvnL [C. civ.] art. 577bis § 6 (BeIg.); C. civ. art. 815-3 (Fr.); see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts.
801, 803 (requiring unanimity for decisions regarding use and management, except that, in the
absence of agreement, a court may make decisions upon petition by a co-owner); Symeon C.
Symeonides & Nicole Duarte Martin, The New Law of Co-Ownership: A Kommentar, 68 TUL. L.
REv.69, 130 (1993) (identifying partition as the solution where unanimity cannot be reached).
255. German law itself allows for majority rule for decisions "corresponding to the character
of the common object," but requires unanimity for "essential alteration[s] of the object." § 745
BGB. Israeli law is essentially the same. Israel Land Law § 30(a) (stating that majority rule is
sufficient for "all matters relating to the ordinary management and use" ); id. § 30(c) (stating that
unanimity is required for "any matter outside the scope of ordinary management and use"); C.A.
810/82, Zol Bo Ltd. v. Zeida, 37(4) P.D. 737 (Isr.). Austrian and Swiss law, with minor
alterations, have the same system. § 833 ABGB (Aus.) (stating that majority rule is sufficient for
ordinary management and use); id. §§ 834-35 (stating that in the absence of unanimity for
significant alterations, dissenters may make specific demands or refer the matter to a judge); ZGB
arts. 647a, 647b, 647d (Switz.) (stating that majority rule is sufficient for most administrative acts,
useful and necessary repairs); id. art. 647e (stating that unanimity is required for improvements
merely to improve beauty or comfort). As an aside, other legal systems influenced by the German
tradition also provide for majority rule in approximately these situations. E.g., SBIRKA ZAKONU
[SB.] art. 139 (Czech Rep.) (stating that majority rule is sufficient for all decisions with the ability
to appeal to the court to reconsider important decisions); AST1KOS KODIX arts. 789, 792-93
(Greece); POLGARI TORVENYKONYV [PTK.] arts. 140, 144 (Hung.) (specifying majority rule for
issues "not exceeding standard measures," but unanimity for others); CODICE CIVILE arts. 110506, 1108 (Italy); MINPO arts. 251, 252 (Japan) (specifying majority by value for acts of
administration, but unanimity for alterations).
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expectations-based test by closely scrutinizing the distribution of the
benefits of such majority decisions.256
Procedural norms of democratic self-governance also distinguish
relatively supportive Continental traditions for liberal commons property
regimes from the less supportive American law." 7 Both jurisdictional and
procedural norms help make participation in systems of majority
governance more meaningful.
3.

The Sphere of Cooperation-EnhancingExit
a. American Law

How to manage the freedom to exit poses a challenge for the liberal
commons. In this sphere, the American and Continental laws overlap
substantially, with a mixed record and few cooperation-enhancing
mechanisms. For example, both have similar provisions regarding restraints
on alienation of co-owned interests and on the choice between partition by
sale and partition in kind. In American law, the limited mechanisms for
cooperation-enhancing exit must be voluntarily agreed upon in advance by
the co-owners. For example, agreements by co-owners not to partition are
generally enforceable so long as they do not amount to a restraint on
alienation and remain in force only for a reasonable time (which can turn
out to be quite a long period, indeed).5" On the other hand, American law
259
disfavors agreements to restrain the sale of co-ownership interests, so coowners are, in general, unable to block sales to outsiders.
Partition is the dominant exit mechanism.26 ° Nominally, partition in
kind is the preferred common law method, 26' but it is complex to implement

256. For instance, if the agreed-upon alteration requires an unfair contribution by one
commoner (for example, paying 1/4, but getting 1/10 of the value) who voted against the
contribution, then that commoner must be compensated. ZGB art. 647d(3).
257. Germany provides each co-owner a right to "adequate" participation in the decisionmaking process, which includes access to adequate information and a right that each co-owner's
opinion be adequately taken into account. § 744 Nr. 1 BGB; Langhein, supra note 248, at 163-64;
Schmidt, supra note 248, §§ 744, 745 9N14-17. In Israel, there are requirements of disclosure and
consultation, Zol Bo Ltd., 37(4) P.D. 737, as well as requirements that parties approach the
consultation open to suggestions. Violations of these requirements void the majority decision.
C.A. 458/82, Vilner v. Golani, 42(1) P.D. 49 (Isr.).
258. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 240, § 6.26, at 116; CRIBBET & JOHNSON,
supra note 200, at 114; WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY
216-17 (3d ed. 2000) (noting that a reasonable time is typically defined as being a time within the
period of the rule against perpetuities). The waivability of the right to call for partition proves to
be one of the central features that distinguishes co-ownership from condominium law in general.
Unlike co-ownership, condominium statutes or agreements prohibit action by unit owners to
compel partition of the co-owned elements, so exit is by sale of the unit only. See STOEBUCK &
WHITMAN, supra, at 181, 217.
259. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 258, at 178 & n.19.
260. But it was not during the earliest days of the tenancy in common form. CRIBBET &
JOHNSON, supra note 200, at 127 (noting that at early common law, only coparceners, but not
cotenants, had the right to demand partition).
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when co-owners cannot agree voluntarily on division. To even out the share

values, courts impose equitable adjustments, such as payments of "owelty"
or easements among the new parcels.262 Physical division often proves

impossible for a minority of the commoners or significantly diminishes the
value of their shares. In most cases now, partition is by sale, with the
proceeds distributed pro rata according to ownership shares.163 However, as
we have shown, auction sales often result in opportunistic exploitation by
one commoner, because the auctions are such poor markets. While the
choice between2 4partition in kind and by sale may be complex-driven by
"personhood"
or utilitarian concerns-neither seems well-tailored by
itself to achieving cooperation-enhancing exit.
Some reforms have been attempted. For example, Alabama passed a
statute that gave co-owners the right to purchase the interests of the coowner who petitioned for partition (but this provision was struck down in
1985).265 Other states allow courts to order a partial partition, thus

respecting the desires of those who wish to remain in cotenancy.266 Both of
these reforms seem to us to be aimed at ameliorating the community-

2 67
destroying effect of the current law of partition. But the reforming states
are not careful enough about the distributive effects of the reforms. The

former reform offers an even thinner market than auction sales do. The
latter-the procedure of "partial partition"--is also problematic. Allowing
a subset of the commoners to carve out a share by physical division absent
general consent is likely to injure the remaining commoners who may be
left with a larger share of a smaller and less valuable piece of property.

261. Ashley v. Baker, 867 P.2d 792, 796 (Alaska 1994) (placing financial interests of co-owners
at the center of the decision whether to partition by sale or in kind); Von Behren v. Oberg, 902
S.W.2d 338, 340-41 (Mo. 1995) (analyzing the financial interests of parties in partition actions); 2
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 240, § 6.26, at 114; Candace Reid, Note, Partitionsin
Kind: A Preference Without Favor,7 CARDOZO L. REv. 855, 856 (1986).
262. Eli v. Eli, 557 N.W.2d 405, 408-11 (S.D. 1997) (remanding for the application of rules of
owelty and creation of easements to ensure equitable partition in kind); STOEBUCK & WHITMAN,
supra note 258, at 215 (defining owelty).
263. 7 POWELL, supra note 221, 1 612; STOEBUCK& WHITMAN, supra note 258, at 221-24.
264. See generally DAGAN, supra note 140, at 41-47 (discussing theories of personhood,
resources, and property); MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 35 (1993)
(discussing personhood and property); WALDRON, supra note 13, at 343-89 (discussing theories of
property and personhood). In the recent case of Eli, the court noted that partition in kind should
trump monetary considerations, especially when "the land in question has descended from
generation to generation." 557 N.W.2d at 410.
265. ALA. CODE § 35-6-100 (1975); Jolly v. Knopf, 463 So. 2d 150, 153 (Ala. 1985) (holding
that the statute violated the equal protection provisions of the federal and state constitutions).
266. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-509 (Michie 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 46-16 (1999); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 29-27-104 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-39-9 (1996).
267. Cases construing the Alabama right-of-first-refusal statute, however, often articulated its
purpose to be the protection of a co-owner against involuntary divestment of her property interest;
thus these courts seemed to focus attention on the liberal rather than the cooperation interest of
remaining co-owners. See, e.g., Williams v. McIntyre, 632 So. 2d 446, 449 (Ala. 1993); Jolly, 463
So. 2d at 153; Black v. McCorvey, 428 So. 2d 607, 608 (Ala. 1983); Ragland v. Walker, 387 So.
2d 184, 185 (Ala. 1980).

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 110: 549

Hence, both reforms may exacerbate the potential minority oppression of
current law and thus paradoxically undermine cooperation.
Perhaps one direction for a more successful reform would be to give
commoners supporting and opposing partition a period of time to secure a
sale on the open market, with the partition auction as a backstop. Or, in a
solution adapted from the law of condominium associations, co-owners
who wish to remain on the land following an auction could be given limited
rights of first refusal (also called preemption rights).26
b.

ComparativePerspective

The countries in the Continental tradition generally provide for the right
269
both to alienate one's share in the property and to call for partition of it.
Commons success is enhanced, however, by allowing a cooling-off period,
namely, by enforcing party agreements that restrain exit (both in the sense
of alienation of one's share and also in the sense of partition) for a limited
time period. This cooling-off period is generally accomplished by declaring

the complete invalidity of agreements to restrain alienation that exceed a
certain number of years, or by subjecting the
restraint after a limited period
270
of time to the broad discretion of the court.
Some provisions of the Germanic systems relating to agreements to
restrain exit go too far, in our view, in supporting the flourishing of the
commons, threatening the liberal premises upon which desirable commons
regimes are based. For instance, German law allows agreements to restrain
alienation of one's share to last perpetually, not mitigated by the authority

268. CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 200, at 130 (discussing rights of first refusal as a
mechanism to give condominium owners a voice in selecting their neighbors); STOEBUCK &
WHITMAN, supra note 258, at 123-24, 182, 203 (discussing rights of first refusal for condominium
associations).
269. See, e.g., ABGB art. 829 (Aus.) (alienation); id. art. 830 (partition); C. civ. art. 815 (Beig.)
(partition); C. civ. art. 815 (Fr.) (partition); § 747 BGB (F.R.G.) (alienation); § 749 Nr. 1 id.
(partition); Israel Land Law § 34(a), 1959, 23 L.S.I. 288 (1968-1969) (alienation); id. § 37(a)
(partition); ZGB art. 646(3) (Switz.) (alienation); id. art. 650(1) (partition); see also LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 805 (West Supp. 2000) (alienation). The French law allows for a court-ordered delay of the
exercise of this right for a maximum of two years if immediate partition would depreciate the value
of the property. C. crv. art. 815. If used too frequently, this provision could represent a troubling
inroad on the availability of exit. Used sparingly, however, and for such a limited period, it may be
an acceptable compromise between the parties' interests in preserving the value of their property and
their right to exit.
Note that countries that did not provide generally for the right to partition without court
approval are excluded from this comparative discussion. See infra note 275.
270. In Israel, the time limitation for agreements restraining alienation is five years, Israel
Land Law § 34(b), and the time limit on agreements restraining partition is left to the discretion of
the court-after three years, the court may order partition despite the agreement if the court deems
it just to do so, Israel Land Law § 37(b). Many Continental regimes limit agreements to restrain
partition to five years. E.g., C. cIv. art. 815 (Belg.); C. CIV. art. 815 (Fr.). Japan also does so.
MINPO art. 256. In Louisiana, parties may agree to restrain alienation and partition for a period of
up to fifteen years. LA. REV. STAT. ANN, § 9:1112 (West 1991).
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of any court to invalidate the agreement, 271 as in the case of German
partition agreements. 27 2 The Swiss law places a thirty-year time limit on the
validity of agreements to restrain partition, but this time limit is arguably
excessive."3 The only limit Austria places on agreements to restrain

partition is termination upon transfer of the property.171 In their desire to
support commons ownership, some of the countries in this tradition have
failed to provide adequately for the relatively free exit that is essential to
the functioning of a liberal commons.27 s

How partition is accomplished is also important to support a liberal
commons. Countries in the Continental tradition use two methods to
achieve distributive equality. The first is scrupulously fair distribution of
the value of the property on partition. Like the American law, most favor
partition in kind (unless this form of division would seriously compromise
the value of the property distributed to the parties). 76 Accordingly, such
271. § 747 BGB (providing the general right to alienate one's share). This right may not be
limited by any juristic act. § 137 c.1 id.
272. German law allows agreements to restrain partition to remain in force indefinitely,
subject to invalidation by the court for "serious cause." § 749 Nr. 2 BGB. This provision seems to
contemplate the possibility of permanent agreements to restrain partition in some circumstances.
§§ 749, 751 id. (referring to the power to exclude "permanently"). Such restrictions potentially
outlast transfers of the property. § 751 id. Although this criterion at first sounds like it may be too
great a restraint on exit-a requirement of "serious cause" sounds much more restrictive than the
broad discretion sometimes placed in courts to invalidate agreements-there is reason to believe
that it is not, in fact, applied so rigidly in Germany. In particular, counterbalancing the concern
that such an agreement will unduly burden the parties' ability to exit is the likelihood that a
restraint on partition that lasts for an "unreasonably" long time, along with other causes that
approximate concerns about restrictions on exit, will count as sufficient "serious cause." Schmidt,
supra note 248, § 749 8. Other causes for invalidating these agreements include a violation of
the minority's procedural rights in decisionmaking or a breakdown in the personal relations of the
commoners, Langhein, supra note 248, § 745, at 20; Schmidt, supra note 248, § 749 11, and
hostility among the commoners such that joint use is impossible, BGH [Supreme Court], NJWRechtsprechungs-Report Zivilrecht [NJW-R-RZ], 10 (1995), 334 (335). Conversely, a good
opportunity to sell the common property is generally not considered a good cause. Schmidt, supra
note 248, § 749 11.
273. ZGB art. 650(2). On this point, Hungary is even more protective of exit, disallowing
agreements restraining partition altogether. PTK. art. 147.
274. § 831 ABGB; see also § 832 id.(stating that a third-party disposition of property in
common can bind the first parties to the disposition, but not their heirs). As an aside, a similar regime
is in place in India, where agreements in perpetuity are allowed, but they have been held not to bind
heirs, on the grounds of public policy concerns with alienation of land. SHAMBHUDAS MITRA,
MrrRA'S CO-OWNERSHIP AND PARTIION 173-74 (1994).
275. There are, of course, much more extreme examples of sacrificing the liberal aspect of
the liberal commons by creating serious barriers to exit. For instance, several Middle Eastern
countries do not have an express right to partition. In Iran, partition is not available if it leads to a
loss in value of the land. QUANUN-I MADANI art. 595 (Iran). In Jordan, partition may only be had
by means of a petition to the court which, presumably, may be rejected. QUANUN AL-MADANI
§ 1040 (Jordan). In Nigeria, as well, partition of jointly owned family land-where "family"
appears to be defined quite broadly-is available only for cause, and, when deciding whether or
not to partition, the court must consider the best interest of the family as a whole. T.O. ELIAS,
NIGERIAN LAND LAW 126-27 (1971).
276. E.g., § 843 ABGB (Aus.); Israel Land Law §§ 39, 40, 1959, 23 L.S.I. 288 (1968-1969);
ZGB art. 651(2) (Switz.); C.A.1017/97, Ridlevitch v. Moda'i, 52(4) P.D. 625 (Isr.). This is also the
law in many other countries influenced by this tradition, including several postsocialist systems. SB.
art. 142 (Czech Rep.); PTK. art. 148 (Hung.); MINPO art. 258 (Japan); GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS
[GRAZIt. K.] art. 218 (Kaz.); B6 LUAT DAN SU [B6 L.] art. 238 (Vietnam). Interestingly, England
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countries pay careful attention to ensuring that each party gets a fair share
using the mechanism of owelty payments. 277 A second approach, used by
Germany, is to limit partition in kind to situations where physical partition
can lead to identical values going to each owner. Germany provides further
security against the possibility that the physical portions will be unfairly
divided by prescribing that after division is made, distribution of the parts is
made by lot.27 8 "Partial partition" is allowed only when the commoners
provide unanimous consent.279
Our discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of rights of first
refusal suggested that providing such a right as a default may benefit a
liberal commons regime. French law provides for a right of first refusal; the
Germanic countries do not. 80
4. A FinalComparison: The British Turn
The American law of co-ownership took its lead from the English
common law.28' So where does England stand? Until recently, the English
law was uniquely unsupportive of co-owned property. 82 Not surprisingly,

effectively has the reverse presumption: Partition by sale is much easier to effect than partition in
kind. See infra note 283.
277. E.g., C. civ. art.
833 (BeIg.); C. CIv. art. 830 (Fr.); Israel Land Law § 39(b); ZGB art.
651(3) (Switz.).
278. § 752 BGB.
279. See Langhein, supra note 248, § 749 53; Schmidt, supra note 248, § 749 U 25-26. For
the law in Israel, see C.A. 623/71, Gan-Boaz v. Englander, 27(1) P.D. 334 (Isr.).
280. C. cIv. arts. 814-15 (Fr.). The right of first refusal is relatively common, and appears, for
example, in many recent French-influenced civil codes. E.g., ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO
FAGUI HUtIAN art. 78 (P.R.C.) (allowing "right of preemption if all other conditions are equal");
SB. art. 140 (Czech Rep.); GRAZH. K. art. 216 (Kaz.); B6 L. art. 237 (Vietnam).
281. To understand the relevant English law, first note some unique structural features of
English land law. Interests in land are divided into legal interests (strictly speaking, ownership)
and equitable interests (strictly speaking, various rights of use and control). English law does not
allow for legal interests to take the form of a "tenancy in common"-the type of commons
property we are considering here. Law of Property Act (LPA), 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 1(6). It
does, however, allow for these interests to be held as a joint tenancy, which differs from a tenancy
in common mainly because of the existence of survivorship rights. E.H. BURN, CHESHtRE AND
BURN'S MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 225 (15th ed. 1993); KEVIN GRAY, ELEMENTS OF
LAND LAw 512 (2d ed. 1994); ROBERT MEGARRY & M.P. THOMPSON, MEGARRY'S MANUAL OF
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 288 (7th ed. 1993). Because of this restriction, all commons
property technically must be held as equitable interests, and not as legally owned property.
Because ownership is just a collection of equitable interests-various rights of use and controlthe restriction could have been merely formal, for land registration purposes. One person could
have owned the legal title but have been made powerless regarding equitable interests, and the coowners could have split the equitable rights among themselves, much as they are split in other
systems. But the formal restriction on legal commons property has had a more profound effect on
jointly held equitable interests in property.
282. In the English system, commons property at law is provided for by means of a trust. The
trustees (no more than four, per the Trustee Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5,c. 19, § 34) are empowered to
make decisions about managing and disposing of the property, but they are bound by various
requirements of consultation and potential judicial overrides. One of the main reasons for
requiring that common ownership be in trust was that a small group of trustees was thought more
able to facilitate alienation of the land than a potentially larger group of common owners. And the
trust structure did indeed have that effect, particularly regarding alienation. A potential purchaser
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when the American law of co-ownership was formed, it followed the
British preference for ending co-ownership rather than supporting its
continuation, even if the two systems did not use the same technical
forms.283 In 1996, however, England passed the Trusts of Land and
Appointment of Trustees Act, moving England significantly closer to a
supportive regime. The details are complex, but, in some ways, the English
law now surpasses its American progeny in supporting the goals of a
successful liberal commons.2 4

Despite these changes, English law still does not go as far as the
Continental systems. To give one example, immediate contribution is not
available, even for basic maintenance and other necessary expenses;" and
as we have argued, delaying such recovery until dissolution increases

was not required to investigate all of the interests in common property; she only needed to deal
with the trustees. M EGARRY & THOMPSON, supra note 281, at 291-92. Before 1996, the trust itself
was referred to as a "trust for sale" and the trustees were under a statutory duty to sell the
property at the earliest convenience. Id. at 289. Under the equitable doctrine of conversion, a
beneficiary was considered to have an interest only in the proceeds of the sale of the co-owned
property, and not the land itself, as equity regarded as "done that which ought to be done" (in this
case, sale). Id. at 257. Trustees could postpone sale, but only if they all agreed to do so (even one
trustee favoring sale was enough to trigger the duty). Id. at 289. Furthermore, alienation of the
property was also facilitated by the power of two trustees validly to sell the land to a bona fide
purchaser, overriding the equitable interests of the co-owners of the property. LPA §§ 2(l)(ii),
27(2). The only major exception to the duty to sell came for property that, like the family home,
had a "purpose" other than sale, and this development came rather far along in the history of the
law. See Williams & Glyn's Bank Ltd. v. Boland, 1981 App. Cas. 487 (appeal taken from Ch.);
BURN, supra note 281, at 236-37. The preference for sale and the ease with which sale could be
accomplished demonstrate the degree to which the common law considered commons property to
be pathological-an arrangement to be ended as quickly as possible.
283. Interestingly, American law rejected the English common-law view of the sale of the
undivided property as the primary means of ending commons property and instead focused on the
right to partition, a much more standard approach globally. Because of its focus on alienating the
undivided property, the English common law actually made it more difficult to obtain partition
than its Continental counterparts. This effectively resulted in an incentive to partition by sale
(without consent of the parties) rather than in kind. Under the present English law, partition of the
property by the trustees requires the consent of all of the beneficiaries, a task much more difficult
than eliminating their interests in the co-owned land through sale and then distributing the
proceeds. Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act (TLATA), 1996, c. 47, § 7.
284. The trust structure has been maintained, but its ingrained preference for sale has been
significantly eroded. The automatic duty to sell and the equitable doctrine of conversion have both
been abolished. TLATA § 3(3) (abolishing the doctrine of conversion); id. § 5(1) (abolishing the
duty to sell). And, although two trustees can still sell the property to a bona fide purchaser and
thus override the equitable interests of the co-beneficiaries, LPA §§ 2(l)(ii), 27(2); TLATA
§ 8(2), the co-beneficiaries are now empowered to petition the court to stop such a sale, see
TLATA § 14. Also, the TLATA adds some procedural norms that enable greater participants by
nontrustees, such as the requirement that, if practicable, the beneficiaries of the trust must be
consulted and the wishes of the majority followed, at least insofar as these coincide "with the
general interest of the trust." TLATA § 11.
285. Leigh v. Dickeson, [1884-1885] 15 Q.B.D. 60; see also GRAY, supra note 281, at 479. To
give another example, agreements to restrain partition and alienation are allowed, but only if they are
a part of the instrument creating the trust, TLATA § 8, and two trustees may override the agreement
by selling the land to a bona fide purchaser for value, id. § 16. These trustee powers decrease the
effectiveness of nonpartition and nonalienation agreements as tools to enable long-term cooperation.
Also, the trustees themselves must be unanimous in exercising their powers, Luke v. South
Kensington Hotel Co., [1879] 11 Ch. D. 121, 125, which can make governance of the commons
more difficult.
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incentives for ending commons ownership. On balance, though, England
has moved substantially toward greater support of a liberal commons
regime, and has left American law behind.

The American law of co-ownership shows what happens when people
are faced with a particularly hostile legal regime, one that assumes shared
management cannot work, and then interposes law that guarantees failure. It
may be too late to reverse the tide for black rural landowners: Too few are
left, and the legacy of discrimination weighs too heavily. But the lessons of
their experience have wide applicability everywhere along the frontiers of
property--cyberspace, genetic research, environmental conservationanywhere people want and need to work together, but each individual
reasonably fears exploitation by the others.8 6 While the American law of
co-ownership now fails, it can do better; the liberal commons points the
way.
V. CODA

Any legal regime for commons resource management must grapple
with three spheres of decisionmaking: what we call the spheres of
individual dominion, democratic self-governance, and cooperationenhancing exit. When law addresses all three spheres successfully, the
resulting ownership form, a liberal commons, helps people achieve the
goals of preserving autonomy through exit while promoting the economic
and social gains from cooperation. Sympathizers of privatization and
communitarian approaches have seen conflict where there can be-and
from a global perspective, often is-harmony. All have overlooked the
facilitative role that law can play in overcoming tragic choice, in particular
by using law to help catalyze and inculcate the social norms that make the
liberal commons into a viable, indeed ordinary, way to own property. More
286. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Conflicts on Authorship,
Ownership, and Accountability,53 VAND. L. REV. 1162 (2000). Dreyfuss explains,
The artist, starving in a garret; the dedicated scientist, experimenting in a garage;
the reclusive professor, burning midnight oil in the office-these are becoming
endangered species. The creative industries have evolved: collaborative production is
replacing individual effort. ... [Yet,] the intellectual property literature has focused so
little on the special problems of collaborative work .... Allocating the incidents of
ownership is not a part of the "mental furniture" of many collaborators; left on their
own, parties can and do run into significant difficulties.... Redesigning the intellectual
property system to take explicit account of collaborative production would have
significant advantages. Well-designed rules reduce transaction costs by functioning as
off-the-shelf arrangements or starting points for ex ante negotiations. They also serve
ex post, as default rules for situations in which the parties discover that they have
omitted key terms from their agreements.
Id. at 1162, 1164-66. These and similar examples give us confidence that the liberal commons
construct will have wide scope for further theoretical development and useful application.
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and more, as "sole and despotic dominion" fades from economic life,
versions of liberal commons regimes are becoming the dominant form of
ownership, though a form that has not yet been recognized, studied, and
supported in a unified way. The metaphor of the "tragedy of the commons"
has blocked legal imagination and innovation; beyond tragedy, there await
liberal commons solutions.

